Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 30, 2025

Toplines

The Kremlin continues to offer no evidence to support its claims that Ukrainian drones targeted Russian President Vladimir Putin’s residence on the night of December 28 to 29 and even rejected the notion that it should provide evidence. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on December 30 that he does not think there “should be any evidence” of a massive Ukrainian drone strike targeting Putin’s residence, likely referring to his residence in Valdai, Novgorod Oblast.[1] Peskov responded to a follow-up question about whether the drone strike left any debris that could be evidence, stating that he “cannot say” and that this question is a matter for the Russian military.

The Kremlin appears to be trying to correct some of the discrepancies in its previous claims about the alleged December 28-29 strikes. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) initially claimed on the morning of December 29 that Russian forces downed 41 drones over Novgorod Oblast on the night of December 28 to 29, fewer than half the number that Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov claimed targeted Putin’s residence in the oblast on the same night.[2] Several Russian and Western sources noted the discrepancy between Lavrov’s claim and the MoD’s claim at the time.[3] The Russian MoD issued an updated situational report (SITREP) on the evening of December 29, claiming that Russian forces downed 91 total drones that were targeting Putin’s residence, including 41 drones over Novgorod Oblast itself and 41 drones over Bryansk Oblast and one over Smolensk Oblast that the MoD claimed had been flying toward Novgorod Oblast.[4] Valdai is roughly 210 kilometers from the Smolensk Oblast border and roughly 435 kilometers from the Bryansk Oblast border. Bryansk and Smolensk oblasts each contain legitimate military and defense industrial targets that Ukraine plausibly could have targeted on the night of December 28 to 29, and Ukraine has struck objects in Bryansk and Smolensk oblasts before.[5] Any instance of Ukrainian drones flying in Bryansk and Smolensk oblast airspace thus does not dispositively mean the drones were heading towards Novgorod Oblast. Moreover, ISW observed no reports or evidence that Russian forces downed Ukrainian drones over Bryansk or Smolensk oblasts on the night of December 28 to 29 in any event.

ISW has still not observed any of the footage or reporting that typically follows Ukrainian deep strikes to corroborate the Kremlin’s claims of Ukrainian strikes threatening Putin’s residence in Novgorod Oblast.[6] Russian and Western sources continue to report counter-indicators to a Ukrainian deep strike targeting Novgorod Oblast. Russian opposition and insider sources reported that residents of Valdai and the surrounding areas did not hear or observe sounds of drones operating or air defenses activating, both of which the residents reported they usually hear, even during previous Ukrainian strikes far from Valdai itself.[7] Le Monde reported on December 30 that a source close to French President Emmanuel Macron stated that there is “no solid evidence” to corroborate Russian claims about the strike against Putin’s personal residence, even after French authorities cross-checked information with its partners.[8]

Kremlin officials are using the alleged Ukrainian strike against Novgorod Oblast to justify Russia’s continued insistence that both Ukraine and the West capitulate to Russia’s original demands from 2021 and 2022. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that the Kremlin will “harden” its negotiating position following the alleged Ukrainian strike but would not disclose this new stance publicly.[9] Peskov stated that Russia is not withdrawing from the negotiation process but will continue dialogue primarily with the United States.[10] Several Russian State Duma deputies echoed Peskov’s statements, with one deputy calling for Russia to present a US-Russian peace plan to Ukraine as a fait accompli and another adding that Russia can “only” negotiate Ukraine’s capitulation now.[11] Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov used a December 30 interview with Russian state media outlet Russia Today (RT) to reiterate Russia’s original war demands that Russian President Vladimir Putin laid out when launching the full-scale invasion in 2022, namely demands for Ukraine’s neutrality, demilitarization (reductions in the Ukrainian military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself), and denazification (the replacement of the current Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian puppet government).[12] Lavrov repeated demands that Ukraine and the West recognize Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea as part of the Russian Federation. Lavrov stated that Russia is “convinced” that the ultimatums that Russia submitted to the United States and Europe in December 2021 can serve as a “starting point” for peace talks. Many of the original Russian demands that Lavrov repeated go against the last publicly available version of the US-Ukrainian-European 20-point peace plan.[13] ISW assessed on December 29 that the Kremlin may intend to use the alleged Ukrainian strike against Putin’s residence to justify its rejection of any peace proposals that come out of recent bilateral US-Ukrainian and multilateral US-Ukrainian-European talks.[14] Kremlin statements about Russia’s 2021 ultimatums, which would have amounted to the destruction of the NATO alliance and required an overhaul of Europe’s security architecture, continue to signal that Russia’s goals in the war are not confined to Ukraine and that a peace deal that does not address Russian demands of NATO and the West outside of Ukraine will not satisfy Russia.[15]

Russian forces continue to increase the range of their drones to strike deeper into Ukraine, underscoring Ukraine’s urgent requirements for traditional air defense systems. The Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies published geolocated footage on December 29 showing Russian forces conducting a drone strike against a Ukrainian Mi-24 helicopter at a forward base northeast of Bilyky, Poltava Oblast (150 kilometers from the Russia–Ukraine border) and an An-26 transport aircraft at the Mykolaiv International Airport (60 kilometers from the Russian-occupied Kinburn Spit).[16] An OSINT analyst reported that satellite imagery has shown the An-26 parked at the airport since 2022, indicating that it is a retired airframe.[17] Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov assessed that Russian forces conducted the strikes with Molniya drones guided through Starlink, rather than through mobile networks, and stated that Russian forces either used sabotage and reconnaissance groups to launch the drones from a closer position or mothership drones to extend the drones’ range.[18] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces installed LTE modems on the Molniya drones to extend their range.[19] The recent long-range drone strikes exploit Ukraine’s scarcity of air defense systems, underscoring Ukraine’s urgent need for point-defense air defense systems to down drones, as electronic warfare (EW) systems are likely insufficient to defend Ukraine’s critical infrastructure from such a geographically pervasive threat.

The Kremlin is moving forward with efforts to mobilize active reservists compulsorily, likely to eventually deploy reservists to combat in Ukraine as Russia continues to suffer a disproportionately high casualty rate compared to its territorial gains. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on December 30 to authorize the deployment of active reservists to special training camps to ensure the protection of critical facilities starting in 2026.[20] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Russia fulfilled its 2025 plan to recruit 406,000 personnel but that Russian losses amounted to 410,000 or more personnel.[21] ISW has observed evidence indicating a Russian presence (either through assaults or infiltration missions) in 4,899.75 kilometers in 2025 — indicating that Russian forces have sustained at least 83 casualties per square kilometer. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin’s ongoing efforts to mobilize reservists for likely deployment to Ukraine in the future further indicate that Russia is facing compounding pressure to sustain its force generation requirements through the legacy system that uses high financial incentives to recruit volunteers due to a lack of volunteers, a lack of resources to fund the payouts, or both.[22] The Kremlin’s efforts to deploy reservists to Ukraine are a domestically risky policy threatening to break the Kremlin’s ongoing social contract with the population, and the Kremlin would likely not pursue this force generation method unless necessary.

Russian President Vladimir Putin officially enacted into law on December 29 the 2026 conscription decree which will transition Russia’s conscription cycle away from biannual spring and fall conscription cycles to a single year-round conscription cycle.[23] Russia historically holds a conscription cycle in the spring and fall every year, where conscripts serve 12 months of mandatory military duty outside the active combat zone in Ukraine.[24] Russian military recruiters under this system conduct the administrative processing for each conscription cycle during three-month periods in the spring and fall. The new decree that Putin signed officially transitions administrative processes for conscription to a year-round process, keeping Russian military recruiters active year-round. This reform will allow Russia to augment its military administrative capacity and enable Moscow to call up a larger volume of conscripts with more flexibility at any point during the year.[25] Putin’s December 29 decree specifies that Russia will call up 261,000 people for mandatory conscript military service throughout 2026, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Russia called up 135,000 personnel for its Fall 2025 conscription cycle, indicating that Russia intends to call up roughly the same number of conscripts in 2026 as it has in 2025.[26] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) clarified on December 29 that Russia will still dispatch conscripts twice a year even as administrative processes necessary for running and staffing recruitment offices will occur year-round.[27] Putin also signed a law in April 2025 that simplified conscription procedures for military-aged men who were selected for semi-annual conscription but did not dispatch for compulsory military service — significantly reducing bureaucratic hurdles and allowing Russian authorities to process called-up conscript candidates more quickly.[28] These decrees are part of the Kremlin’s ongoing efforts to mitigate bureaucratic bottlenecks that complicate Russia’s force generation efforts during large-scale mandatory call-ups. Changes to Russia’s personnel processing system are likely intended to support ongoing efforts to increase the size of the Russian military and allow Russia to mobilize forces faster and more efficiently during both a protracted war in Ukraine and a possible future war against NATO, though the Kremlin is not mobilizing conscripts for war.

Key Takeaways

1. The Kremlin continues to offer no evidence to support its claims that Ukrainian drones targeted Russian President Vladimir Putin’s residence on the night of December 28 to 29 and even rejected the notion that it should provide evidence.
2. Kremlin officials are using the alleged Ukrainian strike against Novgorod Oblast to justify Russia’s continued insistence that both Ukraine and the West capitulate to Russia’s original demands from 2021 and 2022.
3. Russian forces continue to increase the range of their drones to strike deeper into Ukraine, underscoring Ukraine’s urgent requirements for traditional air defense systems.
4. The Kremlin is moving forward with efforts to mobilize active reservists compulsorily, likely to eventually deploy reservists to combat in Ukraine as Russia continues to suffer a disproportionately high casualty rate compared to its territorial gains.
5. Russian President Vladimir Putin officially enacted into law on December 29 the 2026 conscription decree which will transition Russia’s conscription cycle away from biannual spring and fall conscription cycles to a single year-round conscription cycle.
6. Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Kupyansk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

Ukrainian Operations in The Russian Federation

Nothing Significant To Report.

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on December 30 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced along the Pushkarne railway line northwest of Hrabovske (southeast of Sumy City).[29]

Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and Andriivka; northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, Yablunivka, Varachyne, and Sadky; and southeast of Sumy City near Hrabovske on December 29 and 30.[30]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) operating near Oleksiivka are unable to fully conduct evacuations due to Ukrainian drone operations.[31] The milblogger claimed that elements of the 1st Battalion of the 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade near Yablunivka are exhausted and can only receive drone-dropped supplies.[32]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating west of Hrabovske.[33] Drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Pitersk Battalion and 15th Tank Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th CAA, LMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Myropillya (northeast of Sumy City).[34] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and elements of the 1st VDV Battalion of the 217th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[35] Drone operators of the Russian Irlandtsy Strike Detachment of the Grom-Kaskad Drone Brigade are reportedly operating in the Kursk direction.[36]

Ukrainian authorities announced mandatory evacuations from border villages along the Chernihiv-Bryansk Oblast international border. Chernihiv Oblast Head Vyacheslav Chaus announced on December 30 mandatory evacuations from 14 border villages in Novhorod-Siverska, Semenivska, Snovska, and Horodnyanska hromadas (all north to northeast of Chernihiv City and along the border with Bryansk Oblast).[37] Chaus stated that 1,400 residents of these hromadas evacuated in 2025 prior to the December 30 mandatory evacuation and that 300 civilians remain.

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1

Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on December 30 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, Starytsia, and Prylipka and toward Hrafske, Izbytske and Lyman on December 29 and 30.[38] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Lyman and Vilcha (northeast of Kharkiv City).[39]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove and Khatnie on December 29 and 30 but did not advance.[40]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces struck Ukrainian forces in Velykyi Burluk with long-range Geran-2 drones.[41]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2

Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 30 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in northern Kupyansk.[42]

Assessed Russian infiltration: Geolocated footage published on December 30 shows four Russian servicemembers operating in northwestern Myrove (west of Kupyansk) during what ISW assess was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA) at this time.[43]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk in Myrove; north of Kupyansk toward Kolodyazne; east of Kupyansk toward Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk toward Pishchane on December 29 and 30.[44] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Palamarivka, Velyka Shapkivka (both northwest of Kupyansk), and Blahodativka (southwest of Kupyansk).[45]

The Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force reported that Russian forces only maintain limited positions in basements in Kupyansk and that Ukrainian forces have surrounded Russian soldiers at these positions, refuting Russian MoD claims that Russian forces control the town.[46] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger stated that additional recent footage confirms that Ukrainian forces had advanced further into Kupyansk than Russian sources previously assessed and that poor weather conditions are allowing Ukrainian forces to leverage their numerical superiority and are hindering Russian drone operations.[47] The milblogger claimed that Russian media outlets’ claims about Russian control over most of Kupyansk are preventing objective assessments about Russian forces’ numerical inferiority and Ukrainian forces’ successes in encircling Russian forces in some areas.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 3rd Separate Drofa Drone Battalion (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces in central Kupyansk.[48]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on December 30 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov and the Russian MoD claimed on December 29 that elements of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Regiment (2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) seized Bohuslavka (north of Borova).[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Bohuslavka and Novoplatonivka (north of Borova).[50]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Borova near Bohuslavka and southeast of Borova toward Druzhelyubivka and Novoserhiivka on December 30.[51]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction on December 30 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to Sosnove (northwest of Lyman).[52]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Yarova and Korovii Yar and toward Oleksandrivka; north of Lyman near Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Zarichne on December 29 and 30.[53]

An officer of a Ukrainian drone brigade reported that Russian forces continue costly attempts to infiltrate into the Ukrainian near rear in the Lyman direction, exploiting poor weather that degrades Ukrainian drone operations.[54]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and elements of the 349th Separate Signal Battalion (67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[55]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3

Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on December 30 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Siversk, southwest of Dibrova, northwest of Ozerne, and in Zakitne (all northwest of Siversk).[56]

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Dronivka, Platonivka, Ozerne, Zakitne, and Yampil; and southwest of Siversk near Pazeno and toward Riznykivka on December 29 and 30.[57] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Svyato-Pokrovske (south of Siversk).[58][59]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction reported on December 30 that the situation in Dronivka is difficult, but Ukrainian forces maintain control of the settlement.[60] The Ukrainian brigade reported that Russian forces attempt to reach Dronivka by crossing the Siverskyi Donets River from Yampil (west of Dronivka) and the Serebryanske forest area to the west and northwest almost daily.[61] The Ukrainian brigade reported that Russian forces are also attempting to reach Dronivka from the southeast by conducting small-group raids from Siversk. A Russian milblogger claimed that central Zakitne is a contested “gray zone.”[62]

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on December 30 that Russian forces massed fiber optic drones with ranges of over 20 kilometers in the Siversk direction, which forced Ukrainian forces to withdraw drone units from the area and later withdraw remaining troops from Siversk.[63] The Ukrainian General Staff previously acknowledged that Ukrainian forces had withdrawn from the settlement as of December 23.[64]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on December 30 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; east of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka and Pleshchiivka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and toward Sofiivka, Stepanivka, and Novopavlivka on December 29 and 30.[65]

The Ukrainian 14th Army Corps (AC) refuted on December 30 Russian claims that Russian forces control parts of Kostyantynivka.[66]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian armor near Druzhkivka and positions near Rozkishne (west of Kostyantynivka).[67] Drone operators of the 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment) (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian armor on the western outskirts of Kostyantynivka.[68] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 57th Separate Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Sofiivka.[69]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction on December 30 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Toretske (east of Dobropillya).[70]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Pankivka, Novyi Donbas, Ivanivka, and Nove Shakhove on December 29 and 30.[71] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Nove Shakhove and Vilne (east of Dobropillya).[72]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 57th Separate Spetsnaz Company are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Shakhove.[73] FPV drone operators of the 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles in Novyi Donbas and Vilne.[74] Elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) reportedly continue to operate in the Dobropillya direction.[75]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 29 shows drone operators of the Russian 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) striking Ukrainian forces in southeastern Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.[76]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Bilytske, Rodynske, and Sukhetske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman, Rivne, and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Molodetske, and Kotlyne; west of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka; and northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne on December 29 and 30.[77] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Rodynske.[78]

A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are attacking in small groups with low-quality thermal imaging cloaks.[79] The NCO stated that Russian forces are using all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and motorcycles to bring infantry close to the frontline and then relying mostly on drones to resupply infantry.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) and 1435th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely comprised of mobilized personnel) (reportedly of the 2nd CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating within Myrnohrad.[80] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian armored vehicles near Hryshyne, Pokrovsk, and Serhiivka.[81] FPV drone operators of the Irlandtsy Strike Detachment of the Grom-Kaskad Drone Brigade are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[82]

Russian forces attacked near and within Novopavlivka, northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka, and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on December 29 and 30 but did not advance.[83]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on December 30 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Ivanivka, Yalta, and Tovste and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Verbove, Oleksandrohrad, Sichneve, and Vyshneve on December 29 and 30.[84] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Pokrovske (north of Oleksandrivka).[85]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged on December 30 that Ukrainian forces exploited unfavorable weather conditions that degraded Russian drone operations and gaps in Russian positions to reach Oleksandrohrad during recent counterattacks in the Oleksandrivka direction.[86] The milblogger stated that the direction is secondary for the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces, which is prioritizing efforts in the Hulyaipole direction. The milblogger noted that Russian forces would need to regroup and intensify operations in neighboring directions to set conditions to advance toward Pokrovske (north of Oleksandrivka).

A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported that Russian forces rarely use vehicles in the brigade’s area of responsibility (AoR) due to Ukrainian anti-tank ditches and barbed wire.[87] The servicemember added that Russian small infantry groups receive insufficient electronic warfare (EW) devices and that Russian forces rarely use unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs).

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[88]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Donetsk City overnight on December 29 to 30. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on December 30 and published geolocated footage showing Ukrainian forces striking Shahed drone warehouses, logistics facilities, and barracks for Shahed maintenance and support personnel at occupied Donetsk Airport overnight.[89]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City

Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on December 28 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in central Hulyaipole during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[90] ISW assesses that this change did not occur in the last 24 hours.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the Prydniprovska railway west of Dobropillya (north of Hulyaipole).[91]

Refinement of area under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on December 29 shows Ukrainian forces operating west of Nove Zaporizhzhia (north of Hulyaipole), an area where Russian sources have previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[92]

Russian forces attacked near and within Hulyaipole; northwest of Hulyaipole near Bratske and toward Khrystoforivka, Kosivtseve, and Ternuvate; north of Hulyaipole near Danylivka and Varvarivka; northeast of Hulyaipole near Solodke, Rybne, Pryvillya, and Zlahoda; and west of Hulyaipole toward Zaliznychne and Staroukrainka on December 29 and 30.[93] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Zaliznychne.[94]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged on December 29 that Ukrainian forces exploited unfavorable weather conditions that degraded Russian drone operations to conduct a recent mechanized assault across the riverbed of the Haichur River near Dobropillya and Pryluky (northwest of Hulyaipole) toward Rivnopillya (north of Hulyaipole) and Solodke (northeast of Hulyaipole).[95]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are striking Ukrainian vehicles in Zaliznychne.[96] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Prydorozhnie (northwest of Hulyaipole).[97] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles in Zaporizhia Oblast.[98]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on December 30 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of and in southern Prymorske and west of Stepnohirsk (both west of Orikhiv).[99]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Bilohirya, west of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky, Prymorske, and Stepove, and northwest of Orikhiv toward Pavlivka and Novoyakovlivka on December 29 and 30.[100]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger on December 30 described the situation for Russian forces in the Zaporizhia direction as “far from positive” despite December 29 exaggerated claims from Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov and Dnepr Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky that Russian forces are operating within Orikhiv itself.[101] The milblogger acknowledged that Russian forces were unable to hold positions in Novodanylivka and Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) as Ukrainian forces exercise fire control over the settlements from heights above the Kinska River that runs through Orikhiv. The milblogger stated that Russian forces will be unable to gain full control of Prymorske as long as Ukrainian forces control heights east of Prymorske and described the situation as ”very difficult,” contrary to Gerasimov’s and Teplinsky’s December 29 claims that Russian forces have reached within 15 kilometers of Zaporizhzhia City.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 4th Military Base (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Preobrazhenka (north of Orikhiv).[102] Elements of the Nemets group of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA), the 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division), and the 104th VDV Division reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[103]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on December 30 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge on December 29 and 30.[104]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 98th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in eastern Kherson City.[105]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 29 to 30. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Voronezh Oblast and occupied Crimea and 60 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones, of which about 40 were Shahed-type drones, from the directions of Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske and Cape Chauda, Crimea.[106] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 52 drones and that one missile and eight drones struck five locations. Zaporizhia Oblast Head Ivan Fedorov reported that Russian strikes caused a fire at an industrial facility in Zaporizhzhia City.[107] Chernihiv Oblast energy company Chernihiv Energy JSC reported that Russian forces struck an energy infrastructure facility in Chernihiv Raion.[108] Ukrainian Deputy Energy Minister Olha Yukhimchuk reported that this strike left 75,000 residents in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Sumy oblasts without power.[109] Yukhimchuk stated that the scale of damage to Ukraine’s power grid is so high that Ukraine cannot currently accommodate a regular rolling blackout schedule for east (left) bank Kyiv City, parts of Kyiv Oblast, or Odesa Oblast.

Significant Activity in Belarus 

Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks

The Belarusian military continues to highlight the presence of Oreshnik missile systems in Belarus. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage on December 30 showing a Russian officer claiming that his unit completed preparations to operate Oreshnik missile systems.[110] Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi and Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii (iStories) noted that the footage did not show the Oreshnik launchers themselves, but only vehicles from the system.[111]

Belarusian officials continue to highlight deepened economic cooperation with Russia. Belarusian Ambassador to Russia Alexander Rogozhnik claimed on December 30 that the Russia-Belarus trade turnover rose to $60 billion in 2025 and highlighted Belarusian-Russian industrial cooperation to manufacture aircraft, machine tools, and micro- and radioelectronics.[112] The Belarusian government stated on December 30 that Gazprom CEO Alexey Miller met with Belarusian Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Karankevich and Gazprom Transgaz Belarus CEO Vladimir Mayorov to discuss energy cooperation and Belarus’ usage of Russian natural gas.[113]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

Endnotes

[1] https://ria dot ru/20251230/kreml-2065624853.html
[2] https://t.me/MID_Russia/71605; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2025/; https://t.me/mod_russia/59869; https://t.me/mod_russia/59871
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2025/; https://meduza dot io/en/cards/cui-bono; https://x.com/sotaproject/status/2005708571342716973; https://meduza dot io/cards/moskva-utverzhdaet-chto-ukraina-pytalas-udarit-dronami-po-rezidentsii-putina-na-valdae-i-yavno-ispolzuet-eto-chtoby-povliyat-na-mirnye-peregovory; https://ru.themoscowtimes dot com/2025/12/29/lavrov-zayavil-o-massirovannoi-atake-ukrainskih-bespilotnikov-na-rezidentsiyu-putina-a183909; https://theins dot ru/antifake/288190
[4] https://t.me/mod_russia/59894
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-20-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-4-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-7-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-11-2025/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2025; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2024/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21-2025/
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2025/
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2025/; https://www.rucriminal dot info/ru/material/prigotovitsya-k-evakuacii; https://t.me/mozhemobyasnit/22358; https://t.me/severrealii/32410; https://t.me/idelrealii/43673 ; https://t.me/currenttime/52277
[8] https://www.lemonde dot fr/international/live/2025/12/30/en-direct-guerre-en-ukraine-les-accusations-russes-d-une-attaque-sur-une-residence-de-poutine-sont-fausses-repete-zelensky-ajoutant-que-ses-allies-peuvent-le-verifier_6659606_3210.html?#id-2739413
[9] https://tass dot ru/politika/26055299; https://ria dot ru/20251230/rossija-2065629706.html
[10] https://ria dot ru/20251230/rossija-2065629706.html
[11] https://www.gazeta dot ru/politics/news/2025/12/29/27530929.shtml?utm_auth=false; https://www.pnp dot ru/politics/deputat-kartapolov-naglaya-vykhodka-ukrainy-ne-ostanetsya-bez-otveta.html; . https://tve24 dot ru/news/2025/12/29/v-sovfede-prizvali-uzhestochit-pozitsiyu-rossii-v-peregovornom-protsesse/; https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/12/30/v-rossii-nazvali-vozmozhnye-tseli-dlya-otvetnogo-udara-posle-ataki-na-rezidentsiyu-putina/amp/ ; https://www.gazeta dot ru/politics/news/2025/12/30/27533503.shtml?utm_auth=false
[12] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2070350/
[13] https://kyivindependent dot com/zelensky-reveals-20-point-peace-plan-draft-backed-by-ukraine-us/
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2025/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-26-2025/
[16] https://x.com/RALee85/status/2005549834124828917; https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/894; https://x.com/EerikMatero/status/2005706149803483425; https://x.com/MarcinRogowsk14/status/2005705477590753363
[17] https://x.com/MarcinRogowsk14/status/2005705477590753363
[18] https://t.me/serhii_flash/6761
[19] https://t.me/rybar/76362
[20] https://t.me/tass_agency/355010; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/document/0001202512300001?index=2 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/59920 ; https://t.me/istories_media/11136 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/12/30/putin-podpisal-ukaz-o-provedenii-spetssborov-rezervistov
[21] https://24tv dot ua/situatsiya-fronti-shturmovi-viyska-problemi-szch-intervyu-oleksandrom_n2979367#1767022070248
[22] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/warning-the-kremlin-is-preparing-to-mobilize-reservists-on-a-rolling-basis-to-fight-in-ukraine-for-the-first-time/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-17-2025/
[23] http://publication.pravo.gov dot ru/document/0001202512290111
[24] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-29-2025/
[25] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-4-2025/
[26] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/24458 ; http://publication.pravo.gov dot ru/document/0001202512290111?index=1; https://t.me/mod_russia/59889; https://t.me/mod_russia/59891; https://t.me/tass_agency/354899 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/354823; https://t.me/tass_agency/354824 ; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/24453
[27] https://t.me/mod_russia/59891
[28] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-april-30-2025
[29] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/192440
[30] https://www.facebook.com/people/%D0%A3%D0%B3%D1%80%D1%83%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BD%D1%8F-%D0%B2%D1%96%D0%B9%D1%81%D1%8C%D0%BA-%D0%9A%D1%83%D1%80%D1%81%D1%8C%D0%BA/61580619330534/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/30/hotin-zalyshayetsya-pid-kontrolem-zsu-syly-oborony-vidbyvayut-sproby-rf-prosunutysya-na-prykordonni/; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37971; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/106560; https://t.me/wargonzo/31418;
[31] https://t.me/severnnyi/6190
[32] https://t.me/severnnyi/6181
[33] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/192440
[34] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/6265
[35] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37957; https://t.me/mod_russia/59898 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/59922 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/192471
[36] https://t.me/milinfolive/163384
[37] https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1201768-na-cernigivsini-uhvalili-risenna-pro-primusovu-evakuaciu-naselenna-z-14-prikordonnih-sil/; https://www.facebook.com/Chaus.Viacheslav/posts/pfbid02QHRDcRemmNrdoe6sxNBhsWD9Vn19cQktzfQ5urBKfB5TdbkRueu3BbJErKHFEJtjl
[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33210; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33185; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19857; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33183; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19859; https://t.me/wargonzo/31418 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/6183; https://t.me/dva_majors/85883; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37950
[39] https://t.me/severnnyi/6183; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37950; https://t.me/wargonzo/31418
[40] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37950; https://t.me/dva_majors/85883
[41] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37950
[42] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2005888841752928720; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10912; https://t.me/dva_majors/85886
[43] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2006027465559359669?s=20; https://t.me/tass_agency/355029; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10916
[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33185; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19857; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33183; https://t.me/wargonzo/31418; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37950;
[45] https://t.me/mod_russia/59907; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/106546
[46] https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19855
[47] https://t.me/rybar/76390
[48] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2005888841752928720?s=20; https://t.me/dva_majors/85886 https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10912
[49] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/78888; https://t.me/mod_russia/59905; https://t.me/mod_russia/59907; https://t.me/mod_russia/59909
[50] https://t.me/wargonzo/31418
[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33210; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19859;
[52] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69754
[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33210; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33185; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19857; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33183; https://t.me/wargonzo/31418; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69754
[54] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a3z0nHuXt5w; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/30/posylayut-i-posylayut-svoyih-bijcziv-na-myaso-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-vorog-zaznaye-velykyh-vtrat/
[55] https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/889; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/192447; https://t.me/milinfolive/163374
[56] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37977 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/31418 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/192481
[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33210 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33185 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33183 ; https://t.me/SouthernRepublic/29483 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/192435 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37977 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/31418
[58] https://t.me/SouthernRepublic/29483 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/192435 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37977
[59] https://t.me/SouthernRepublic/29483 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/192435 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37977
[60] https://t.me/sloaembr_81/343 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/30/vorog-prodovzhuye-forsuvaty-siverskyj-donecz-ta-zdijsnyuvaty-rejdy-v-napryamku-dronivky-81-sha-brygada/; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1201700-u-dronivci-skladna-situacia-armia-rf-namagalasa-visaditi-desant-na-gumovomu-covni-81-oaembr/
[61] https://t.me/SouthernRepublic/29483 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/192435
[62] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37977
[63] https://24tv dot ua/situatsiya-fronti-shturmovi-viyska-problemi-szch-intervyu-oleksandrom_n2979367#1767022070248; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33201
[64] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-23-2025/
[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33210; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33185; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33183; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69753
[66] https://www.facebook.com/reel/1414292667039504; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/29/okupantiv-u-kostyantynivczi-nemaye-a-vsi-tverdzhennya-voroga-pro-cze-nepravdyvi-19-j-korpus/
[67] https://t.me/tass_agency/355002; https://t.me/mod_russia/59898
[68] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14834; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2006023682007715918?s=20
[69] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14832
[70] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/106569
[71] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/106569; https://t.me/wargonzo/31418; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69753; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33185 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33183
[72] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69753
[73] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14832
[74] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14833
[75] https://t.me/dva_majors/85919
[76] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2005711709684781334; https://t.me/Sib_army/8809
[77] https://t.me/wargonzo/31418; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33210; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33185; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33183; https://t.me/dva_majors/85883; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69753
[78] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69753
[79] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/30/vony-pryhodyat-majzhe-pusti-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-pihotynczi-rf-jdut-na-legkij/
[80] https://t.me/mod_russia/59897; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/48968
[81] https://t.me/mod_russia/59898; https://t.me/mod_russia/59922
[82] https://t.me/milinfolive/163384
[83] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37965; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33210; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33185; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33183
[84] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33210; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33185; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33183; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37965
[85] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69752
[86] https://t.me/rybar/76388; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-26-2025/
[87] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/30/pevnyj-syurrealizm-na-oleksandrivskomu-napryamku-okupanty-zastosovuyut-konej/
[88] https://t.me/voin_dv/18218
[89] https://t.me/robert_magyar/1795; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/30/syly-oborony-zavdaly-udaru-po-infrastrukturi-shahediv-na-donechchyni/; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1201572-sili-oboroni-vdarili-po-doneckomu-aeroportu-de-okupanti-oblastuvali-punkt-sporadzanna-sahediv-madar/; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/25781; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2005925094917357871
[90] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/32757; https://t.me/Tsaplienko/85475
[91] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69752
[92] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2005739451834843338; https://t.me/mod_russia/59886
[93] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33210; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33185; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33183; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13501; https://t.me/wargonzo/31418; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69752; https://t.me/yurasumy/26306
[94] https://t.me/rybar/76367
[95] https://t.me/rybar/76367; https://t.me/rybar/76369; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2025/
[96] https://t.me/voin_dv/18208; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2005862037172158741?s=20; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2005723802811130285?s=20
[97] https://t.me/voin_dv/18211
[98] https://t.me/voin_dv/18217
[99] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69751; https://t.me/wargonzo/31418; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/192481
[100] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33185; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33183; https://t.me/wargonzo/31418; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69751
[101] https://t.me/rybar/76392; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2025/
[102] https://t.me/wargonzo/31433
[103] https://t.me/dva_majors/85889; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37954; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37957
[104] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33210; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33185; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33183
[105] https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/31712
[106] https://t.me/kpszsu/51097
[107]; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/30691
[108] https://suspilne dot media/1201412-v-rosii-zaavili-pro-udar-po-rezidencii-putina-v-kievi-zaperecuut-rozstril-civilnih-v-pokrovsku-1406-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1767075315&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[109] https://t.me/astrapress/100758
[110] https://t.me/modmilby/52785; https://x.com/MOD_BY/status/2005898797151301808?s=20
[111] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/rosiya-rozgornula-v-bilorusi-oreshnyk-ta-pokazala-mashyny-kompleksu-ale-ne-puskovu/; https://t.me/istories_media/11132
[112] https://www.sb dot by/articles/dopolnyat-drug-druga-v-razvitii.html; https://t.me/embassybel/13045 ; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/353024
[113] https://t.me/government_by/3974 ; https://belta dot by/economics/view/karankevich-provel-vstrechu-s-glavoj-gazproma-756701-2025/ ; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/353059