The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.
Toplines
Iran continues to try to frame the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) “management” of transit through the Strait of Hormuz as the new status quo. The United States and international community must continue to reject Iranian efforts to try to establish this new status quo, as it is detrimental to international commercial interests and sets a dangerous precedent for freedom of navigation in international waterways. The IRGC Navy has begun publishing daily roll-ups of the number of vessels that use Iran’s illegal traffic separation scheme. The IRGC Navy reported that 20 vessels passed through Iran’s traffic separation scheme on May 30.[1] Iran has repeatedly used force, including attacks on commercial vessels and naval mines, to force vessels to use Iran’s illegal and unrecognized traffic separation scheme. The IRGC Navy also claimed that it provided “safe passage” to some vessels for “humanitarian reasons,” likely to try to portray the IRGC Navy as a reasonable actor despite its deployment of mines, as well as attacks and harassment of vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters separately stated on May 30 that Iranian armed forces are “fully” managing the strait and that all vessels must transit only through Iran’s traffic separation scheme after receiving permission from the IRGC Navy.[2] The headquarters warned that Iranian armed forces will target any military vessel that intervenes in Iran’s management of the strait or disrupts maritime traffic, likely in response to a May 29 US CENTCOM notice that the US Navy will conduct military operations north of the Musandam Peninsula in the Strait of Hormuz and target vessels “engaged in, or supporting, mine-laying activities.”[3]
Neither the United States nor Iran has indicated that the two sides have narrowed gaps on key issues in the US-Iran negotiations, such as economic relief for Iran.[4] An unspecified senior Trump administration official told the New York Times on May 29 that the Trump administration believes it is close to an agreement but that the United States and Iran have still not resolved certain issues, including the unfreezing of Iranian assets.[5] Trump announced that “no money will be exchanged” in a social media post on May 29, likely referring to frozen Iranian assets.[6] Iranian officials have repeatedly demanded the release of frozen assets as a “precondition” for talks about nuclear issues.[7] An Iranian negotiating team member close to Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf asserted on May 30 that Iran’s “irreversible” access to $12 billion USD in frozen assets is one of Iran’s “main” conditions for any possible agreement.[8] Iranian state media, citing “unofficial details of a possible US-Iran memorandum of understanding,” separately claimed that the United States would give Iran full access to $12 billion USD in frozen assets within 60 days.[9] Ghalibaf recently led an Iranian delegation to Qatar to try to secure the “immediate” and “unconditional” release of $12 billion USD, but Qatar rejected Iran’s request, according to anti-regime media on May 29.[10]
Iran likely seeks unrestricted access to its frozen assets to reduce the effect of US sanctions and the naval blockade and support its military reconstitution. US sanctions and the naval blockade have hindered Iran’s ability to raise revenue that the regime could use to reconstitute its military capabilities.[11] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei stated on May 25 that assets released under a potential agreement with the United States would go toward Iran’s defense and military sectors, including Iran’s missile and drone programs.[12] ISW-CTP previously assessed that granting Iran economic relief by unfreezing funds or removing sanctions would likely decrease Iranian military reconstitution timelines.
The hardline faction within the Iranian regime is not a monolith but contains a spectrum of actors with varying priorities, opinions, and political positions. ISW-CTP continues to assess that hardline IRGC officials, particularly IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and his inner circle, are unwilling to make meaningful concessions in negotiations with the United States. Analysts close to the Iranian regime told the New York Times on May 29 that hardliners, whom they claimed represent a “minority view,” are attempting to derail negotiations.[13] The hardliners in this report likely specifically refer to ultrahardliners affiliated with the Paydari (Stability) Front. Two unspecified senior Iranian officials told the New York Times that Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Deputy Secretary Ali Bagheri Kani criticized Iran’s negotiating team for being “too conciliatory” during the first round of US-Iran negotiations in Islamabad in April.[14] Bagheri Kani has close ties to Paydari (Stability) Front leader Saeed Jalili.[15] The Paydari (Stability) Front represents only one element of the hardline faction, and other, non-Paydari (Stability) Front hardliners have also posed an obstacle to negotiations by refusing to make concessions and insisting on maximalist demands. Vahidi and his inner circle, whom ISW-CTP assesses are currently dominating regime decision-making, have not signaled any willingness to soften their maximalist demands in negotiations, for example. The hardline faction in the regime also includes some “pragmatist” officials, such as Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who leads Iran’s negotiating delegation. ISW-CTP previously assessed that Ghalibaf may not be aligned with key decision-makers in Tehran, such as Vahidi, and may be more willing to make concessions in negotiations.
Iran may have used a Chinese-made man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) to target US aircraft during the war, according to three individuals familiar with the matter speaking to Western media. The three individuals told NBC News on May 29 that Iran “probably” struck the US F-15 fighter jet over southwestern Iran on April 3 using a Chinese-made shoulder-launched missile.[16] Iran was reportedly in discussions with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) before the war began in late February 2026 to acquire MANPADS.[17] The PRC may have also provided Iran with a radar system to bolster its integrated air defense system before the war.[18] One of the sources and a US official told NBC News that the PRC may have given Iran a YLC-8B long-range anti-stealth surveillance radar in the “early days of the war.”[19]
The possible PRC military transfers underscore the nature of the PRC’s military partnership with Iran. The PRC has demonstrated a willingness to bolster Iran’s military capabilities without risking direct entanglement in the conflict and is one of the few technologically advanced countries that appears willing to sell military equipment to Iran. The PRC reportedly sold Iran an advanced reconnaissance satellite that Iran used to target US military bases across the region during the war, for example.[20] The PRC is also a key partner helping Iran reconstitute its missile program and has continued this support by sending Iran missile fuel precursor during the conflict.[21]
Iran’s Axis of Resistance
Lebanese Hezbollah and the Israeli Campaign in Lebanon
Hezbollah attacked Israel Defense Forces (IDF) positions and communities in northern Israel with drones and rockets on May 29 and 30, likely in response to recent IDF advances in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah claimed that it has conducted at least 13 drone and rocket attacks targeting northern Israel since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff, including attacks targeting the northern Israeli towns of Safed, Kiryat Shmona, and Nahariya.[28] Hezbollah fired over 30 rockets in the attacks, some of which struck the commercial center of Kiryat Shmona and landed off the coast of Nahariya on May 30.[29] A Hezbollah drone also struck a military area near Shomera on May 30.[30] Israeli media reported that the Hezbollah attacks did not cause any casualties.[31]
Hezbollah likely launched attacks on northern Israel in response to IDF advances beyond the “Yellow Line” in southern Lebanon in recent days. The IDF 36th Division crossed the Litani River on May 29 to remove the threat of anti-tank fire to the Galilee Panhandle, according to an Israeli Army Radio correspondent.[32] A Lebanese open-source intelligence (OSINT) analyst and Lebanese media reported that the IDF advanced into western Yohmor, Nabatieh District, on May 28, citing satellite imagery of IDF armored vehicles.[33] Israeli forces reportedly advanced south of Dibbine, Marjaayoun District, on May 29, and into Ghandouriyeh, Bint Jbeil District, on May 30.[34] Hezbollah claimed that it conducted a complex improvised explosive device (IED) ambush on IDF forces in Ghandouriyeh on May 30, in which the group fired mortars and rockets at Israeli forces after detonating the IED.[35] The attack may support the analyst’s claim that the IDF advanced into the town.[36] A Hezbollah-aligned journalist also reported that Hezbollah engaged the IDF in Ghandouriyeh on May 30.[37]
Other Axis of Resistance Activity
Nothing significant to report.
