Toplines
The 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)’s funding for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) significantly decreases the ability for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to successfully operate in pursuit of Iranian objectives unless the Iraqi government is both extremely pro-Iranian and willing to lose US security funding. The new NDAA requires that the Iraqi government make credible steps on three conditions, or the ISF will not receive more than 75 percent of the funds authorized under the NDAA. These conditions are:
· Condition 1. The Iraqi government must take credible steps to reduce the operational capacity of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that are not integrated into the “Iraqi security forces” through a “publicly verifiable disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process” (DDR).[1]
· Condition 2. The Iraqi government must take credible steps “to strengthen the authority and operational control of the prime minister of Iraq as commander-in-chief.”[2]
· Condition 3. The Iraqi government must take credible steps to “investigate and hold accountable members of Iran-aligned militia groups or members of the ISF operating outside of the formal chain of command” who attack US or Iraqi personnel or engage in “illegal or destabilizing” activities.[3]
Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may attempt to circumvent the 2026 NDAA’s conditions by establishing facade groups within the PMF and obfuscating their distortion of the official command and control structures within the PMF. These conditions considerably strengthen US leverage over the Iraqi government. Greater US leverage decreases the militias’ freedom of maneuver substantially. These militias have a long history of using facade groups and nominally unaffiliated military units to obfuscate their loyalty to Iran, their destabilizing activities, and their responsibility for attacks targeting US personnel, Israel, and energy infrastructure in Iraqi Kurdistan.[4] The NDAA directly targets this practice by conditioning continued Defense Department funding in support of the ISF on the Iraqi government’s ability to reduce the capacity of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. The militias could slightly alter the use of facade militias and unaffiliated units tactic by establishing nominally unaffiliated PMF brigades that in fact answer to a militia chain of command that ultimately answers to the IRGC Quds Force. The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias could attempt to circumvent these conditions using the facade tactic in the following ways:
· Circumventing Condition 1. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias could use the covert nature of their extralegal militias to create nominally new PMF brigades while claiming that their covert elements had been disarmed, demobilized, and reintegrated. The NDAA calls for a “publicly verifiable” DDR process. The covert nature of extralegal Iranian-backed Iraqi militias means that these militias could withhold complete unit rosters—if such documents exist—to quietly insert covert Iranian-backed Iraqi militia commanders and fighters into new or existing PMF units, even if they executed a performative and public DDR process. These elements would still be constrained by the third NDAA condition, however.
· Circumventing Condition 2. The militias could obfuscate their distortion of the official chain of command by claiming that they follow the chain of command while receiving orders through extralegal channels. The 5th Iraqi Army Division, for example, was nominally unaffiliated in 2017 but in fact answered to the Badr Organization, not the army’s chain of command.[5] Such changes may be difficult to detect without a careful review of the behavior of individual units and the positions of individual commanders.
· Circumventing Condition 3. The militias could use their pervasive political and judicial influence to “arrest” commanders and fighters before quietly releasing them at a later date. Previous Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi arrested several commanders involved in illegal activities before powerful militia political interests intervened to get the commanders and fighters released.[6] Many of these releases are widely reported, which indicates that the militias would need to further alter their tactics to successfully circumvent this condition.[7]
These conditions may also require a resolutely pro-Iran government to overcome. The United States is currently attempting to prevent the formation of an extremely pro-Iran government. Five unspecified prominent Iraqi officials told regional media that the United States has conveyed that it will refuse to engage with any senior security official or prime minister affiliated with Iranian-backed militias.[8] An unspecified Shia Coordination Framework member told regional media on December 12 that the framework may select a “consensus candidate“ as a result of US pressure.[9] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose alliance of Iraqi Shia parties, some of which Iran backs. CTP will continue to assess Iraqi reactions to these conditions. The Iraqi federal government and Iraqi militias have so far failed to react.
An Israeli journalist reported that Iran has reconstituted its “heavy” missile stockpile to around 2,000 missiles, which is consistent with other Israeli reports that Iran has prioritized rebuilding its missile program and stockpile after the Israel-Iran War.[10] “Heavy” ballistic missiles presumably refer to medium-range ballistic missiles that can reach Israel. This assumption would suggest that Iran reconstituted its stockpile from between 1,100 and 1,300 missiles to 2,000 missiles between June 2025 and December 2025, also assuming that post-war Israel Defense Forces (IDF) estimates about the missile stockpile were correct.[11] CTP-ISW assessed on December 9 that Iran views reconstituting its ballistic missile program as an immediate strategic priority, likely because reconstituting the program is more achievable in the short term than other defense projects.[12] Some Iranian officials appear to want to improve the technical capabilities of these missiles over time, but could calculate that the perceived immediacy of future Israeli strikes requires an expansion of the stockpile of current systems.[13]
This rapid reconstitution indicates that Israel either failed to destroy all of Iran’s planetary mixers or that Iran has acquired or built new planetary mixers used to produce solid fuel ballistic missiles. Israeli Military Intelligence head Major General Shlomi Bender told US Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz on December 8 that Israeli damage to Iran’s ballistic missile industry was “less severe” than initially assessed, and that Iran has already restored its production capacity.[14] Iran could theoretically use a trough mixer, though planetary mixers are more efficient.[15]
An unspecified Israeli official told the Israeli journalist that the rebuilt ballistic missile program is an unacceptable threat.[16] The official said that Israel “must coordinate with the [United States on] the red lines and actions [Israel] will take in the future, perhaps even in the near future.”[17]
Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-affiliated media proposed on December 12 that Iran establish a “joint operations room” with the Axis of Resistance to mitigate their weaknesses in the wake of conflict since October 7, 2023.[18] The concept of an Axis of Resistance joint operations room is not new, and Iran has historically relied on joint operations rooms to coordinate activity across the Axis of Resistance.[19] Iran and the Axis of Resistance use these joint operations rooms to accomplish operational objectives in pursuit of their shared strategic objectives, but Hamas’s October 7 attack was poorly coordinated and resulted in a series of Israeli operations that badly degraded elements of the Axis.[20] Operations rooms could be used for expansive objectives on the regional level — such as destroying Israel — as well as less expansive objectives on the country level, like expelling US forces from Iraq. This new proposal demonstrates how Iran is considering mechanisms to facilitate learning from unsuccessful Axis of Resistance campaigns in this period of reconstitution for the Axis of Resistance.[21]
The United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) is emphasizing its intent to establish an independent state to Western diplomats as it consolidates control on the ground in eastern Yemen. The STC launched an offensive in southern Yemen on December 3 to seize key areas of Wadi Hadramawt, which successfully extended its presence to all eight governorates in southern Yemen.[22] These eight governorates were previously part of the former People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), which controlled southern Yemen prior to Yemen’s unification in 1990.[23] UK-based The Times reported on December 12 that an unspecified STC source told Western diplomats that Yemen will never be unified again as it ”prepares to declare an independent state.”[24] The source added that the STC’s declaration came at a meeting with members of the United Nations Security Council on December 9, during which the STC made it clear that ”the 1990 unity was over.”[25] These remarks align with the STC’s recent statements, which indicates that the group views its consolidation in eastern Yemen as a step toward formalizing independence.[26] The STC has had long-standing secessionist aims, and many of its leaders led or fought for the South during the 1994 Civil War.[27]
The STC is continuing to consolidate administrative control and establish new military units in eastern Yemen. STC-affiliated ministers issued new political and security appointments on December 12 that placed “sensitive positions” in al Mahra Governorate under STC influence, including control of the Shahn border crossing, which is the primary commercial crossing between Yemen and Oman.[28] STC officials also appointed new heads for the Geological Survey and Mineral Resources Authority and al Ghaydah International Airport.[29] These new appointments would likely strengthen the STC’s leverage over border access, trade flows, and energy-related infrastructure in eastern Yemen.
The STC also dismissed the commander of the Yemeni Army’s 123rd Infantry Brigade and appointed Jalal Ali Mohammed al Jaari as the new brigade commander.[30] The 123rd Infantry Brigade is a Yemeni army unit in the 2nd Military Region and is stationed at al Hat Camp, al Mahra Governorate.[31] Yemeni media reported on December 12 that the STC also deployed forces from southern governorates, including Dhaleh, Aden, and Abyan, to Mahra Governorate, and ordered officers and personnel originating from northern governorates to leave the governorate to consolidate STC control.[32] CTP-ISW has previously assessed that the STC will likely backfill these positions because they are located in southern Yemen, where the STC seeks to establish an independent state.[33]
Turkish Army Ground Forces Commander General Metin Tokel met with Syrian defense officials in Damascus on November 12 amid indicators that Turkey may be preparing for potential offensive operations in northeastern Syria.[34] Syrian Defense Minister Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra and Tokel discussed several “issues of mutual interest,” including strengthening Syrian-Turkish military cooperation, in Damascus on November 12.[35] Tokel and Qasra almost certainly discussed efforts to enhance Syrian-Turkish defense cooperation under the military cooperation agreement that Turkey and Syria signed in August 2025.[36] The agreement stipulates that Turkey will provide the Syrian government with weapons, military equipment, training, and logistical support.[37] Syrian military commanders are currently training in Turkey under this agreement.[38]
The timing of Tokel’s visit to Syria is notable because the Turkish government continues to outline political justifications for a potential joint Turkish–Syrian military operation against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The Turkish Defense Ministry spokesperson reiterated on December 12 that the SDF must integrate into the Syrian army on an ”individual basis” and not ”as units,” which is a demand that Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan identified as a Turkish red line on December 6.[39] Senior Turkish political and defense officials warned on December 12 that the SDF is failing to integrate into the Syrian government and noted that the SDF’s integration agreement with the Syrian government is set to expire at the end of 2025.[40] Coordination between Syrian and Turkish ground forces would be a necessary part of possible preparations for a joint offensive or Turkish operations in Syrian territory.
The Turkish Defense Ministry denied on December 12 that recent footage of Turkish units deploying to Syrian positions suggested that the Turkish army was preparing for an operation.[41] Turkish forces deployed reinforcements on December 7 to Afrin and Manbij in Aleppo Province, according to Turkish, Syrian, and Kurdish sources.[42] The ministry characterized the movement captured in the footage as “routine troop rotations.”[43] A spokesperson for an SDF faction similarly told Saudi media on December 11 that the SDF has not observed any Turkish “readiness for a major military operation” along the SDF-Syrian or SDF-Turkish frontlines.[44] CTP-ISW will continue to monitor indicators of a possible Turkish-Syrian operation in northeastern Syria.
