The dramatic surge in U.S. military power in the Caribbean since August 2025 — anchored by the arrival of the USS Gerald R. Ford, the deployment of F-35s to Puerto Rico, expanded naval patrols, the buildup of some 15,000 U.S. personnel, and the announcement of a naval blockade of Venezuelan tankers carrying sanctioned oil — suggests that Washington is preparing for a forceful confrontation with Venezuela. The Trump administration initially framed the deployment as a counter-narcotics surge, but the scale of the buildup far surpasses what is typically required to interdict drug boats. Moreover, the recent seizure of a “zombie tanker,” the ensuing blockade declaration, and President Donald Trump’s public statements instead suggest the threat of coercive action against Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro’s government.
Understanding how Venezuela might respond to U.S. military action requires an accurate assessment of the capabilities, readiness, and doctrinal approach to external intervention of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana). The country’s government under President Hugo Chávez (1999-2013) adopted that name to honor Simón Bolivar, the 19th-century liberator who fought for South American independence and whose ideals form the basis for modern Venezuelan nationalism, known as Bolivarianism, linking the military to his revolutionary legacy.
While Venezuela styled itself as a regional military heavyweight under Chávez, the Venezuelan armed forces of 2025 are an aging, hollowed-out force whose most potent systems suffer from poor readiness and chronic maintenance issues. Moreover, low morale among the rank-and-file indicates a weak will to fight, further undermining a military response.
Even so, Maduro would likely be able to count on some loyalist forces, as well as a panoply of non-state armed actors whose existence depends on the regime staying in power, allowing the state to mount a guerrilla-style resistance. Although the Maduro government no longer invokes “Plan Zamora” by name, the civil-military, national-defense, and internal-control structures it established — specifically, territorial defense zones, militia mobilization, neighborhood surveillance networks, and urban resistance cells — remain deeply embedded in Venezuela’s security architecture. Thus, while state security forces cannot deter a U.S. military assault in conventional terms, it retains enough asymmetric capacity to make any foreign intervention prolonged, costly, and politically fraught.
The Bolivarian National Armed Forces and Other Armed Actors: Numbers, Capabilities, and Constraints
Between 1999 and the mid-2010s, Venezuela projected an image of regional military power distinct from its Latin American neighbors. Chávez’s purchases of Su-30MK2 fighters, T-72B1 tanks, S-300 and Buk air-defense batteries, BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, and a suite of Russian artillery systems established an arsenal that, on paper, exceeded the capacity of many regional militaries. However, the collapse of Venezuela’s economy, hyperinflation, sanctions, and the outmigration of nearly eight million people since the mid-2010s have sharply eroded this force.
According to recent assessments, the Venezuelan military has roughly 123,000 active personnel: 63,000 in the army; 25,500 in the navy; 11,500 in the air force; and 23,000 in the national guard. These are supplemented, however, by roughly 8,000 reservists and at least 200–300 thousand members of the Bolivarian militia (milicia bolivariana), a separate reserve civilian-military body created by Chávez with the purpose of ensuring territorial defense and countering internal dissent. Members of the Bolivarian militia, who are embedded across neighborhoods, state institutions, and workplaces, pledge to defend Chávez’s “Bolivarian revolution” and enforce regime loyalty.
Other armed groups, many of whom share the government’s ideology, would provide additional support for the regime. Paramilitary colectivos, urban groups ideologically committed to Chávez’s 21st-century socialism and directly tied to the state, have often acted on orders from Maduro, engaging in repression and carrying out deadly acts of violence against political opponents. These pro-government armed groups enjoy state financing as well as near total impunity to operate on the margins of — or entirely outside — the law. Likewise, left-wing Colombian guerrilla groups which have found safe haven in rural parts of the country would be likely to keep fighting precisely because their existence is tied to the survival of Chavismo in power.
However, despite its size, the Venezuelan military’s hardware is severely degraded. Maintenance on the Su-30 fleet is inconsistent: At least three of Venezuela’s 24 aircraft have crashed, and spare parts for their Russian engines and avionics are scarce. The army’s T-72 tanks, BMP-3 vehicles, Msta-S howitzers, and Smerch rocket launchers likewise suffer from low operational readiness, constrained by fuel shortages, limited training, and years of cannibalization. The navy, meanwhile, has only one functional frigate and one Type-209 submarine, and although several corvettes exist on paper they are lightly armed and lack modern air-defense systems.
Despite this, the Venezuelan armed forces retain a numerically significant air-defense network, including roughly a dozen S-300 batteries, multiple Buk and Pechora systems, and a wide distribution of Igla-S man-portable air-defense systems. Combined with Venezuela’s rugged terrain and densely populated urban centers, these systems give Caracas some capacity to complicate U.S. air operations, particularly in the first hours of a conflict.
Politically, the Venezuelan armed forces remain tightly bound to the Maduro government partially due to more than two decades of coup-proofing measures like politicized promotions, purges of perceived disloyal officers, and illicit enrichment, from gold mining to narcotrafficking. Venezuelan Minister of Defense Vladimir Padrino López has held his position (and other posts) for more than 11 years, reflecting how his future is similarly tied to that of Maduro. The irony is that this top-heavy, over-politicized structure with deliberate jurisdictional overlap and redundancy produces elite leadership that has managed to weather several crises, yet has weakened operational effectiveness, tactical initiative, and capacity for sustained conventional operations through its emphasis on loyalty over competence and overlapping chains of command.
How the Venezuelan Military Could Respond to U.S. Airstrikes
A U.S. air campaign would likely begin by striking Venezuela’s air defenses, airbases, command-and-control facilities, and key logistics nodes. The Venezuelan armed forces appear to be well aware of this sequencing and have prepared accordingly.
Venezuela’s air-defense strategy depends heavily on dispersal, concealment, mobility, and the use of decoys. S-300 and Buk systems, while formidable in theory, are maintained unevenly and lack the dense integration and radar redundancy typical of peer air-defense networks. Nonetheless, Venezuelan air defense could pose meaningful risks during the first hours or perhaps days, especially around the major urban and strategic centers of Caracas, Maracay, and Puerto La Cruz. Mobile Igla-S teams scattered across urban terrain would add to the complexity of targeting, particularly against low-flying aircraft or helicopters. However, the readiness and technical quality of Venezuela’s air-defense network is too low to survive a sustained bombing campaign. Once fixed radars and command nodes are destroyed, the usefulness of remaining systems would decline significantly.
Venezuela’s most credible high-end military option in an air campaign is the Su-30MK2 fighter, several of which carry Kh-31 anti-ship missiles, according to recently released Venezuelan air force videos. While the fleet is small and limited by maintenance issues, these aircraft could theoretically attempt opportunistic strikes against U.S. naval vessels, particularly if the United States disperses its assets. At the same time, such attacks would likely be the effective equivalent of suicide missions: U.S. airborne warning and control systems, F-35s, and Aegis-equipped destroyers give the United States overwhelming advantages in detection, targeting, and interception.
While the Venezuelan armed forces cannot defend its airspace for long, it can still impose time costs, economic costs, and risk early in a conflict, increasing the political and operational price of U.S. coercion. After the likely neutralization of most air defenses, the Venezuelan military would shift to asymmetric survival tactics by relocating leadership into hardened or underground facilities; mobilizing militias, paramilitary groups, and National Guard units for internal control; and preparing for occupation and insurgency scenarios.
How Venezuela Could Counter U.S. Covert Operations
Venezuela’s ability to counter U.S. covert operations rests less on technical sophistication than on early detection. The regime has built a dense counter-intelligence ecosystem centered on the General Directorate of Military Counterintelligence (Dirección General de Contrainteligencia Militar), the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (Servicio Bolivariano de Inteligencia Nacional), intelligence elements within the National Guard, and longstanding Cuban intelligence advisors. While Venezuela lacks advanced signals intelligence, it compensates through extensive human intelligence networks embedded in state institutions, security forces, and society.
If the United States attempted, say, covert sabotage or special operations raids, the regime’s response would likely prioritize exposure and attribution over quiet disruption. Public arrests, forced confessions, and rapid dissemination through state media would be the tools to strip clandestine actors of secrecy. The objective would be deterrence by visibility, turning covert action into a political event that raises the risks for collaborators and collapses the boundary between foreign interference and domestic opposition. This exposure-based strategy is reinforced by aggressive information operations that frame alleged covert activity as proof of U.S. aggression.
Finally, Venezuela’s legal and institutional environment lowers the threshold for disrupting covert operations. Emergency powers, anti-terrorism laws, and the routine use of military jurisdiction over civilians would allow the regime to move quickly against suspected networks with minimal oversight. Although the milicia and colectivos are poorly suited for combat, they are effective as informants, monitors, and enforcers at the neighborhood level, extending the state’s surveillance reach. The trade-off is intelligence distortion and reputational cost, but from the regime’s perspective the strategy succeeds if it raises the operational, political, and moral costs of U.S. covert action.
How Venezuela Could Respond to a Ground Invasion
A U.S. ground invasion is the least likely but most consequential scenario. Militarily, the Venezuelan armed forces would be defeated in open battle: Its navy cannot contest sea control, its air force cannot contest air superiority, and its army lacks the readiness to face a modern mechanized force. However, the end of conventional resistance would not necessarily mean the end of war.
Following the doctrine of “war of all the people” (Guerra de Todo el Pueblo) introduced in Plan Zamora, the government could attempt to turn its dense cities into grinding battlegrounds and turn to guerrilla warfare tactics and what Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello has called “active prolonged resistance.” The government would also implement a plan of “anarchization,” turning to the intelligence services and ruling-party supporters to create disorder on the streets and make Venezuela as ungovernable as possible for foreign forces.
The dense urban environment of Caracas, for instance, would limit the presence of tanks, create challenges for drones, and provide advantages for snipers and small-ambush teams. The country’s varied topography and large size — some 12 times larger than Panama — would provide further challenges for U.S. forces. Militia members would easily blend into the civilian populations to which they belong, while the Venezuelan armed forces would attempt to avoid large armored engagements and instead break into small units supported by militias and colectivos. National guard and intelligence units would maintain political discipline and suppress collaborators. While militias are not combat-effective in conventional terms, they can support urban ambushes, intimidate civilians, provide intelligence on U.S. troop movements, and sabotage supply lines.
Militarily, the United States could seize Venezuelan territory rapidly. However, politically, it could find itself trapped in a multi-year stabilization operation resembling a hybrid of its role in post-invasion Iraq and Colombia during the implementation of Plan Colombia, where insurgency forces complicated state-building efforts. The very conditions that degrade the Venezuelan military’s conventional operations, such as economic collapse, proliferation of armed groups, and political polarization, would magnify the difficulty of post-invasion governance.
Weak But Dangerous
The reality of a possible U.S.-Venezuelan confrontation is that while Venezuela cannot win a conventional war, it can make a U.S. intervention a costly, uncertain, and politically explosive gamble. The Venezuelan military’s conventional units are aging, top-heavy, undertrained, and poorly maintained. The navy is almost nonfunctional, the air force is fragile, the army can field modern armor but cannot sustain it, and the air-defense network is limited. However, the Venezuelan government has built a dense internal-control system and an expansive militia network, and it boasts an urban geography that amplifies asymmetric resistance. The Venezuelan military’s operational doctrine reflects this reality: survive the first blows, then disperse, adapt, and bleed an invader politically through guerrilla warfare. Even limited strikes risk setting in motion consequences that U.S. forces could manage tactically, but that U.S. political leaders might find difficult to rein in once the conflict expands beyond the initial use of force.
John Polga-Hecimovich is an associate professor of political science at the U.S. Naval Academy, where he was previously the director of the Forum for Latin American Studies. He is the co-editor of Authoritarian Consolidation in Times of Crisis: Venezuela Under Nicolás Maduro (Routledge Press, 2025).
Image: Carlos E. Perez S.L via Wikimedia Commons
