Since 2022, Russia’s war, covert operations in Europe, and demands for a larger sphere of influence have focused attention on a possible Russian attack on a NATO member. If Europe is better prepared for this contingency today, it is primarily due to the efforts of a small band of front-line states urgently improving their own defenses, rather than the European hinterland seeking to catch up. If anything, the gap between Western Europe and those states that take defense seriously has grown even wider.
Finland, for example, is an unlikely candidate for attack. It has never given cause to doubt its readiness for defense. Its armed forces and society are singularly focused on readiness to face the country’s primary threat.
Since 2022, Russia’s war, covert operations in Europe, and demands for a larger sphere of influence have focused attention on a possible Russian attack on a NATO member. If Europe is better prepared for this contingency today, it is primarily due to the efforts of a small band of front-line states urgently improving their own defenses, rather than the European hinterland seeking to catch up. If anything, the gap between Western Europe and those states that take defense seriously has grown even wider.
Finland, for example, is an unlikely candidate for attack. It has never given cause to doubt its readiness for defense. Its armed forces and society are singularly focused on readiness to face the country’s primary threat.
Finland also shows how Europe’s front-line states have been developing the means to strike back. Recognizing that the ability to launch deep strikes into Russia is critical for deterring Moscow, Finland invested early in such weapons. Integration of long-range Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles into the Finnish Air Force was completed in 2018, long before the escalation of Russia’s war demonstrated beyond doubt how essential these capabilities are. Longer-range missiles are also on order.
Despite widespread Western portrayals as tiny and defenseless, the Baltic states are not passive. Estonia has invested heavily in deep-strike capabilities within the limits of its smaller budget. Like Finland, it aims to ensure that any challenge from Russia will not be limited to Estonian territory but have immediate consequences for Russia itself.
As a front-line state, Estonia maintains territorial defense forces ready at short notice, making its capacity for resistance far greater than Western war game scenarios might suggest. With a wartime strength of 43,000 soldiers and a deep pool of trained reservists, Estonia fields substantially more forces than its European NATO allies—including a British-led NATO forward force—could swiftly deploy.
In Latvia and Lithuania, the numbers and capabilities tell a similar story. Canada leads Latvia’s expanded NATO Multinational Brigade, while a German brigade anchors a NATO battlegroup that will be fully operational by 2027. With or without NATO contingents, both Baltic states are far from undefended, with mobilized forces ready at or before the outset of a crisis.
Poland emerged early as Europe’s rearmament leader, rapidly scaling up investment in equipment and manpower. It has NATO’s highest military spending as a share of GDP (roughly 4.5 percent in 2025) and the largest proportion devoted to weapons systems (about 54 percent), rather than salaries and other costs. The country fields NATO’s third largest army, with plans to expand further, backed by strong public commitment to defense rooted in a clear understanding of the threat.
Poland, too, recognizes that offensive capabilities are essential to deterrence and readiness. Discussions of the Suwalki corridor—a strip of land between Belarus and Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave—as a key NATO vulnerability habitually overlook that defending Kaliningrad itself presents a greater challenge for Russia. The exclave seems even more exposed now, with much of its garrison reportedly transferred to the front line in Ukraine.
The three Baltic states and Poland are investing heavily in border fortifications, drawing on lessons from Ukraine that Russian forces must be slowed at the start of any incursion. All four, plus Finland, have withdrawn from the Ottawa Treaty banning anti-personnel mines (which Russia never signed), gaining an additional tool to delay Russian movement.
Much European alarm over the Trump administration’s recalibration of U.S. security commitments focuses on capabilities provided by U.S. forces. But Europe does not need to replace them like for like. To assure its defense, it need not be the United States; it must only be strong and resilient enough, by whatever route, to convince Moscow that the escalation risks outweigh rewards.
Europe as a whole has not stepped up. Its security in the short and medium term will rely on coalitions of the willing and able. Given slow efforts in countries further west—and lingering doubt that major allies would fight Russia in a crisis—the continent’s defense will hinge on a subset of eastern and northern states that take the threat seriously. In a self-help world, these front-line states are far from helpless.
Read the other seven thinkers on four years of war in Europe here.
