Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 17, 2026

Toplines
Ukrainian forces struck several Russian defense industrial plants and oil infrastructure objects in Moscow City and Oblast overnight on May 16 to 17 following Russia’s intensified strike series against Ukraine on May 13 and 14. The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported on May 17 that Ukrainian forces struck the Angstrem Semiconductor Plant, which produces microelectronics for high precision weapons, at the Elma Technopark in Zelenograd (northwest of Moscow City), and a geolocated image published on May 17 shows a smoke plume at the plant.[1] A Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) unit reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Elma Technopark in Zelenograd, and Russian opposition outlet Astra posted footage of a fire at the Elma Technopark after the strike.[2] It is unclear if Ukrainian forces struck more than one object at the Elma Technopark. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 17 that Ukrainian forces also struck the Solnechnogorsk oil pumping station, which pumps, stores, and ships large volumes of fuel for Russian forces, near Durykino (northwest of Moscow City), and geolocated footage shows a large fire at the station.[3] The SBU reported on May 17 that Ukrainian forces struck the Moscow Oil Refinery in Kapotnya Raion, Moscow City, and geolocated footage shows a smoke plume at the refinery after an audible explosion.[4] Moscow City Mayor Sergei Sobyanin acknowledged on May 17 that Ukrainian forces struck the Moscow Oil Refinery but claimed that the strike did not disrupt the refinery’s operations and that Ukrainian forces only hit the refinery’s checkpoint.[5] The SBU reported on May 17 that Ukrainian forces also struck the Volodarsk oil pumping station (southeast of Moscow City).[6] Moscow Oblast Governor Andrei Vorobyov acknowledged on May 17 that Ukrainian drones hit several infrastructure facilities and that drone strikes and debris also damaged residential areas.[7] Sobyanin claimed that Russian forces downed over 120 drones over Moscow City on May 16 and 17.[8] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces used several Ukrainian-developed drones, including the RS-1, FP-1 and BARS-SM drones during the May 16 to 17 strikes on Moscow Oblast.[9] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on May 17 that Ukrainian forces struck targets in Moscow Oblast in response to Russian strikes on Ukrainian cities.[10]
Astra reported on May 17 that a fire broke out at a runway at Sheremetyevo International Airport (north of Moscow City) after airport authorities claimed that drone wreckage hit the runway.[11] The Russian Transportation Ministry announced temporary airspace restrictions and the diversion of 51 flights on the night of May 16 to 17 and stated that two thirds of flights from Moscow airports were delayed for over two hours.[12]
Ukraine’s May 16 to 17 strike series proved that Russia is unable to effectively defend the Russian capital, a weakness that generated significant frustration in the Russian ultranationalist information space. The Kremlin’s response to the strikes thus far has been muted and likely aimed at downplaying the impact of the strikes, in contrast to the harsh milblogger responses. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova criticized the Ukrainian strikes for their purported impact against civilians, omitting the several successful strikes against Russian defense industrial plants and oil infrastructure objects.[13] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to a media question about the use of “powerful bombs” by a “nuclear power state” after the Ukrainian strikes against Moscow City and Oblast, stating that Russia still ”cannot be threatened as a nuclear power and its very existence cannot be threatened.”[14] Peskov’s statement appears to hand-wave the severity of the strikes in an attempt to manage public expectations about how the Kremlin will respond. Independent Russian media outlet Agentstvo reported on May 17 that Russian state media TV channels, including Perviy Kanal, Rossiya-1, and NTV, devoted only about one minute to Ukraine’s strikes against Moscow, only focusing briefly on the response to civilian implications.[15] Agenstvo noted that the channels reported that Russia had already conducted vague “retaliatory strikes” against Ukraine, though the nature of this claimed retaliation is unclear. Russian ultranationalist milbloggers responded to the Ukrainian strikes against Moscow on May 17 by noting ineffective Russian air defenses, particularly in Moscow Oblast, and complained about Ukraine’s increasing strike capabilities.[16] The milbloggers called for Russia to establish a multi-echeloned and unified air defense network aimed at countering drones over a broad area of land around Moscow City as well as an early-warning system, noting that Ukrainian forces are expanding the scale and intensity of their long-range strikes and straining Russia’s air defenses.[17] Some Russian milbloggers called for Russia to conduct retaliatory strikes, including with tactical nuclear weapons, and criticized Peskov and Zakharova’s responses as inadequate.[18] One milblogger criticized Russian shutdowns of mobile internet as ineffective in actually mitigating Ukrainian strikes.[19] Russian milbloggers have repeatedly highlighted failures in Russia’s air defenses and called for retaliation as the Kremlin has consistently failed to protect or strengthen Russia’s rear area air defenses.[20]
Key Takeaways
- Ukrainian forces struck several Russian defense industrial plants and oil infrastructure objects in Moscow City and Oblast overnight on May 16 to 17 following Russia’s intensified strike series against Ukraine on May 13 and 14.
- Ukraine’s May 16 to 17 strike series proved that Russia continues to be unable to effectively defend the Russian capital, a weakness that generated significant frustration in the Russian ultranationalist information space.
- Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.
- Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian warships in the Caspian Sea overnight on May 16 to 17. Russian forces launched 278 drones against Ukraine.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
See topline text for additional Ukrainian strikes in Russia.
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian warships in the Caspian Sea overnight on May 16 to 17. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on May 17 that Ukrainian forces struck a Project 10410 Svetlyak-class patrol ship belonging to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Border Service in Kaspiysk, Republic of Dagestan (roughly 1,000 kilometers from the frontline).[21]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued isolated ground attacks along various parts of the frontline northwest, northeast, and southeast of Sumy City on May 15.[22] A Russian milblogger and a source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces advanced near Sopych (northwest of Sumy City along the international border).[23] Geolocated footage published on May 13 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in northern Andriivka (north of Sumy City) after what ISW assesses was likely an infiltration mission.[24]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian personnel concentration near Volfinsky, Kursk Oblast (northwest of Sumy City along the international border) overnight on May 16 to 17.[25]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1st Guards Engineer Brigade (Northern Grouping of Forces) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[26] This is the first evidence ISW has observed of the existence of this unit.
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City in and near Vovchansk on May 15 but did not advance.[27]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported Russian attacks in the Velykyi Burluk direction on May 15 following recent Ukrainian advances in the direction. Ukrainian Joint Forces Group Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated that Russian forces have been withdrawing in some areas of the Velykyi Burluk direction and do not hold much ground in the area.[28] Ukrainian forces liberated Odradne (east of Velykyi Burluk) as of May 15, and the Ukrainian 16th Army Corps reported that Ukrainian forces had seized 22 square kilometers in total in the Velykyi Burluk direction.[29]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Kupyansk direction on May 17 but did not advance.[30]
Russian forces continued ground assaults against Ukrainian positions on the left (east) bank of the Oskil River in the Kupyansk direction. Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on May 17 that Russian forces continue efforts to reenter Kupyansk through Holubivka (north of Kupyansk) and are attempting to reduce the Ukrainian foothold on the left bank of the Oskil River.[31] Trehubov noted that repeated Russian claims of the seizure of Kupyansk have forced Russian forces to continue their attacks toward Kupyansk for informational effects.
Ukrainian forces continued their short-range strike campaign against the Russian near rear in the Kupyansk direction. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 17 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near occupied Dvorichna (on the frontline northeast of Kupyansk) on May 16 or overnight on May 16 to 17.[32]
A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on May 17 that Russian forces continued ground assaults in the Borova direction but did not advance.[33]
Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov congratulated elements of the Russian 423rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) for the claimed seizure of Borova as of May 16.[34]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian air defense assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Geolocated footage published by Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi on May 17 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian Tor-M2 air defense system southeast of occupied Zakhidne (roughly 103 kilometers from the frontline) overnight on May 16 to 17.[35]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Slovyansk direction. Geolocated footage published on May 17 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position north of Rai-Oleksandrivka (east of Slovyansk) in what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[36]
Russian forces are intensifying ground operations and interdiction efforts in the Slovyansk direction, likely as part of their ongoing Spring-Summer 2026 offensive. An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on May 17 that Russian forces began intensifying ground assaults in the direction at the end of last week (about May 16) but still rarely field light vehicles in combat, only using the vehicles to dismount infantry a few kilometers from the frontline.[37] The Ukrainian officer stated that Russian forces are using guided glide bombs and Molniya-2 fixed-wing drones, which can carry smaller first-person view (FPV) drones, to strike Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, while using tactical FPV drones, fiber-optic drones, and ambush drones closer to the frontline, all as part of ongoing interdiction efforts. The officer noted that the quality of Russian infantry in the Slovyansk direction is low but that elements of the relatively elite Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Systems have better quality personnel.
Russian forces continued ground assaults in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka and Dobropillya tactical areas on May 17 but did not make confirmed advances.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in southwestern Kostyantynivka.[39]
Russian forces continued ground assaults in the Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka directions on May 17 but did not advance.[40]
Order of Battle: The Russian military command may have redeployed elements of the Russian 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade from northern Sumy Oblast to the Pokrovsk direction. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage on May 17 reportedly of artillery elements of the Russian 83rd Separate VDV Brigade striking Ukrainian positions in the Pokrovsk direction.[41] ISW last observed reports of elements of the Russian 83rd Separate VDV Brigade operating in northern Sumy Oblast as of April 23.[42]
Ukrainian forces continued their short-range strike campaign against the Russian near rear in the Pokrovsk direction. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Corps published geolocated footage and reported on May 17 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian equipment depot in a former mine and antennas mounted on a coal mine waste dump east of occupied Selydove (roughly 17 kilometers from the frontline and southeast of Pokrovsk).[43] The corps reported that Russian forces used the antennas to guide Molniya fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drones and provide internet to Russian forces in Pokrovsk. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Udachne (on the frontline southwest of Pokrovsk), a troop concentration near occupied Myrne (roughly 11 kilometers from the frontline northeast of Pokrovsk), and two troop concentrations near occupied Novoekonomichne (roughly eight kilometers from the frontline northeast of Pokrovsk) on May 16 or overnight on May 16 to 17.[44] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi published geolocated footage on May 17 showing Ukrainian forces striking a command post of the Russian 9th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) in Pokrovsk overnight on May 15 to 16 – a strike that the Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 16.[45]
Russian forces reportedly continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on May 17 but did not advance.[46]
Ukrainian forces continued their short-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in the near rear of the Oleksandrivka direction. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 17 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration near Krasnohirske (south of Oleksandrivka) on the night of May 17 to 18.[47]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff and Brovdi reported on May 17 that Ukrainian forces struck a command post of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) near occupied Buhne (roughly 67 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of May 17 to 18.[48] Footage published on May 17 by the Ukrainian USF shows Ukrainian forces striking a fuel and lubricants train in occupied Fedorivka (roughly 138 kilometers from the frontline).[49] Geolocated footage published on May 17 by the Ukrainian USF shows Ukrainian forces striking a meeting of Russian commanders of the 2nd Sapper-Engineer Battalion (91st Sapper-Engineer Regiment, reportedly under the operational command of the Northern Grouping of Forces) in occupied Shakhtarsk (roughly 104 kilometers from the frontline).[50]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on May 17 and recently advanced in the area.[51]
Geolocated footage published on May 16 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Myrne (southwest of Hulyaipole).[52]
Russian forces conducted limited ground operations west and southeast of Orikhiv on May 15 but did not advance.[53]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian infrastructure targets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on May 17 that Ukrainian forces struck telecommunications towers in unspecified locations in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast and port cranes in occupied Berdyansk (about 97 kilometers from the frontline) on May 16 to 17 as part of Ukraine’s mid-range strike campaign.[54] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed that Ukrainian forces also struck unspecified targets in occupied Melitopol (about 75 kilometers from the frontline).[55]
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on May 17 but did not advance.[56]
Ukrainian forces likely continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Kherson Oblast. Geolocated footage published on May 17 shows Ukrainian forces striking what Ukrainian OSINT sources reported was a Russian missile and drone storage and preparation point near occupied Shchaslyvtseve (roughly 190 kilometers from the front line), resulting in a fire.[57]
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea. Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported on May 17 that Ukrainian forces struck several targets at the Belbek military airfield in occupied Sevastopol (roughly 325 kilometers from the frontline), including a Pantsir-S2 air defense system, a hangar housing the radar for an S-400 system, an Orion drone control system, a Forpost ground-based UAV control system, a ground-to-air data transmission system, and a control tower and hanger.[58] The Crimea-based Telegram channel Crimean Wind reported an explosion near the Belbek airfield and NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data shows a heat anomaly near the Belbek military airfield on May 17.[59] Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev acknowledged on May 17 Ukrainian strikes on Sevastopol.[60] The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported on May 17, and geolocated imagery confirms that Ukrainian forces struck a communications node of the Russian Black Sea Fleet near occupied Myrne (roughly 200 kilometers from the front line).[61] Brovdi reported on May 17 that Ukrainian forces launched eight unguided air-launched rockets with 60-kilogram warheads from long range drones at a range of up to 500 kilometers, during the Ukrainian strike on Myrne.[62]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted long-range drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on May 16 to 17. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 287 Shahed, Gerbera, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya decoy drones from the directions of Oryol, Kursk, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[63] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 279 of the drones and that the remaining eight drones hit seven locations. Ukrainian officials said that Russian forces struck enterprises and residential buildings in Dnipro City, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and in Kyiv City; residential infrastructure in Kharkiv City; and an educational institution in Kutsurub Hromada, Mykolaiv Oblast.[64]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on May 17 that Russian forces launched over 3,170 long-range strike drones, 74 missiles, and 1,300 guided glide bombs against Ukraine in the past week (since about May 10).[65]
Russian forces may have resumed using Belarusian telecommunications infrastructure to support Russia’s long-range strike campaign against Ukraine. Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on May 17 that Russian forces may have used Belarus to deploy Shahed radio control points to act as signal relays during strikes against Kyiv City on May 13 and 14.[66] Beskrestnov noted that Ukrainian countermeasures prevented Russian forces from using Belarus for its long-range strike campaign in this way at the end of Winter 2025-2026.
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38767; https://t.me/SBUkr/17574; https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/2055834091661005029
[2] https://t.me/army_1usc/975; https://t.me/astrapress/112880
[3] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38767; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/13025; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2055854653217321038; https://x.com/NotWoofers/status/2055842168414052695; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2055931028158415159; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2056024110145388616; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/20800
[4] https://t.me/SBUkr/17574; https://t.me/army_1usc/975; https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/2055920495174770695; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/20771
[5] https://t.me/mos_sobyanin/19895
[6] https://t.me/SBUkr/17574
[7] https://t.me/vorobiev_live/11496
[8] https://t.me/mos_sobyanin/19895
[9] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38767
[10] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19087
[11] https://t.me/astrapress/112923; https://t.me/svo_online/6714
[12] https://t.me/Mintrans_Russia/9739
[13] https://tass dot ru/politika/27437405
[14] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1090001; https://x.com/nexta_tv/status/2056054713590665663
[15] https://t.me/agentstvonews/15378 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/05/17/rossiyskie-telekanaly-preumenshimi-masshtab-udara-ukrainy-na-moskvu
[16] https://t.me/sashakots/61751; https://t.me/dva_majors/93083; https://t.me/rusich_army/29618; https://t.me/dva_majors/93075 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/93079
[17] https://t.me/sashakots/61751; https://t.me/rusich_army/29618
[18] https://t.me/dva_majors/93099; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/25309; https://t.me/milinfolive/172442; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/50690
[19] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/72344
[20] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_27-23/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-1-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-10-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-8-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-3-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2026/
[21] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2366
[22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38764; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38721; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38719; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/115225; https://t.me/wargonzo/34243
[23] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/115225; https://t.me/severnnyi/8035
[24] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11935; https://www.instagram.com/reel/DYSKf4roUwV
[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38767
[26] https://t.me/mod_russia/63698
[27] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38764; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38721; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38719; https://t.me/wargonzo/34243; https://t.me/severnnyi/8035
[28] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1312039-na-velikoburluckomu-napramku-okupovani-teritorii-deso-skorotilisa-tregubov-pro-situaciu-na-frontah-harkivsini/
[29] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1311221-sili-oboroni-povernuli-kontrol-nad-odradnim-na-harkivsini-16-korpus/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2026/
[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38721; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38719; https://t.me/wargonzo/34243; https://t.me/gvZapad/18578; https://t.me/gvZapad/18583
[31] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1312039-na-velikoburluckomu-napramku-okupovani-teritorii-deso-skorotilisa-tregubov-pro-situaciu-na-frontah-harkivsini/
[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38767
[33] https://t.me/gvZapad/18578
[34] https://t.me/mod_russia/63702; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2026/
[35] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2055951539819135211; https://x.com/front_ukrainian/status/2055952703835062463; https://t.me/usf_army/1934; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1312065-ukrainski-dronari-znisili-zrk-tor-m2-i-vdarili-po-komandnih-punktah-armii-rf-sbs/; https://www.facebook.com/reel/972461722420212/?locale=uk_UA; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2366
[36] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11938; https://t.me/MPBEdelweiss/1454
[37] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1311988-fpv-droni-but-po-logistici-ta-infrastrukturi-tilovih-mist-rf-aktivizuvala-sturmi-na-slovanskomu-napramku/; https://youtu.be/G_-e1L724OU
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[39] https://t.me/motopatriot78/51934
[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38764; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38721; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38719; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/115232
[41] https://t.me/mod_russia/63713
[42] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2026/
[43] https://t.me/corps7DSHV/1454; https://x.com/aroslav24470/status/2055966861305545018; https://x.com/Kukulkan415/status/2055993653332439544; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/2055962221423763916; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2366
[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38767
[45] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2366; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2026/; https://x.com/aroslav24470/status/2055959663942815989
[46] https://t.me/wargonzo/34243; https://t.me/voin_dv/19554;
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38767
[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38767; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2366
[49] https://x.com/front_ukrainian/status/2055952703835062463; https://t.me/usf_army/1934; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2366
[50] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2366
[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38764; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14007; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38721; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14004; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38719; https://t.me/wargonzo/34243; https://t.me/voin_dv/19554;
[52] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2055668511725572320; https://t.me/stepova_61/1998
[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38764; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14007; https://t.me/wargonzo/34243
[54] https://x.com/front_ukrainian/status/2055952703835062463; https://t.me/usf_army/1934; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2366
[55] https://t.me/vrogov/24655
[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38721; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14004; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38719; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38767
[57] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/35765; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/20774
[58] https://t.me/SBUkr/17574
[59] https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@33.560,44.672,14.209z; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/99330; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/99382
[60] https://t.me/razvozhaev/20737
[61] https://t.me/usf_army/1934; https://x.com/aroslav24470/status/2055947122151706764; https://x.com/aroslav24470/status/2055948643824242972
[62] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2367
[63] https://t.me/kpszsu/62080
[64] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/29456; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/29463; https://t.me/astrapress/112906; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1311974-rf-atakuvala-harkiv-bezpilotnikami-vnoci-ta-vranci-17-travna-so-vidomo-pro-naslidki/; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/3972; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/3973; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/3982; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1311984-nicna-ataka-sahediv-u-saltivskomu-rajoni-harkova-17-travna-naslidki-vlucanna-foto/; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/10159; https://t.me/kyivoda/48376; https://suspilne dot media/mykolaiv/1311967-travmuvalisa-dvoe-colovikiv-armia-rf-atakuvala-fpv-dronami-ta-sahedami-mikolaivsinu/; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1KSon7UdVh/
[65] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19086
[66] https://t.me/serhii_flash/7410




