With an increasing number of Russian warships operating close to the UK, the overstretched Royal Navy is being forced to employ lightly-armed OPVs, RFAs and minehunters to monitor them. This sends a message of weakness. This editorial argues that also deploying multiple small, fast uncrewed surface vessels offers a rapid and affordable means to provide more effective deterrence.
The Channel optics problem
The Russians appear to have assigned a warship to loiter off the UK on a semi-permanent basis. Most recently this was RFS Admiral Grigorovich, which has now been relieved on the ‘Channel Patrol Task’ by RFS Neustrashimy. In June, a Russian frigate fired several warning rounds close to a British yacht, while in July Neustrashimy conducted a live-firing exercise with its 100mm medium-calibre gun about 40 miles south of Plymouth.
While the RN is understandably keen to highlight its work through frequent press releases, the optics are often poor with a significant speed and firepower mismatch: an OPV, minehunter or tanker keeping pace with a missile-armed frigate several times its displacement.
Monitoring foreign naval vessels, maintaining a recognised maritime picture and supporting the enforcement of sanctions are routine duties for the RN. Its commitment to the task over recent years has been admirable, even if the vessels employed are not so impressive. Fielding lightly armed ships imposes little uncertainty or tactical pressure on the Russians. It allows them to operate largely on their own terms and with a measure of complacency. The Kremlin typically attempts to apply pressure gradually at perceived weak points, testing what will be tolerated and measuring the response. Failure to respond more robustly risks encouraging further escalation.
Russian warships have a legal right to operate in the English Channel and in waters beyond the 12-mile territorial limit, but their recent activity has become increasingly belligerent. There is little to deter them when their commanders know the RN may struggle to field a fully armed warship to intercept them. Even when a frigate or destroyer is available, the RN’s fleet-wide anti-ship capability remains woefully inadequate (a subject for a separate article).
Capability to hand
The RN has already taken delivery of 20 Kraken Technology Group’s K3 Scout USVs, although the initial purchase was intended for training, experimentation and concept development rather than the creation of an operational strike force. Subsequently, the RN announced that Scout USVs will be deployed to the Middle East, potentially to help protect future mine hunting operations in the Strait of Hormuz. Clearly the RN is already devoting time and effort to developing USV doctrine and support arrangements.
The 8.4m composite craft is capable of speeds exceeding 55 knots and has a payload capacity of around 600kg. Depending on configuration and operating profile, Scout K3 has a range of approximately 650 nautical miles. The vessel can carry several different payloads, including electro-optical cameras for gathering high-quality imagery, which are fitted as standard. Other potential payloads include electronic warfare systems, communications relay equipment and launchers for small uncrewed aerial vehicles. Kraken also promotes the design as suitable for precision-strike roles, although the RN has not publicly stated that its craft will routinely carry warheads.
Kraken has the capacity to increase production, and there is no reason the RN could not rapidly acquire a much larger number of USVs, potentially drawing on other UK manufacturers as well. The immediate value of a coastal flotilla lies in providing a comparatively mature, affordable and road-transportable platform that can be deployed in numbers.
Kraken Technology Group’s facility in Fareham. The company recently announced $175m of additional funding for expansion, and the startup, which only began operations in 2021, is now valued at $1bn (Photo: Kraken Technology Group).
In October 2025, five USVs were demonstrated swarming HMS Tyne while being remotely controlled from approximately 500 miles away. The trial showed how a geographically separated control point could manage several small craft without requiring a crewed command ship to remain permanently close to them.
There is already some organisational foundation to build on. The Coastal Forces Squadron is increasingly involved with autonomous systems, while the Fleet Experimentation Squadron operates the 42-metre experimental vessel XV Patrick Blackett as a testbed for new technology and uncrewed operations. A persistent coastal USV force does not yet exist, but the RN is not starting from scratch.
A coastal drone screen
Several USV flotillas could be established, initially at suitable harbours along the south coast. A mature force might comprise three or four squadrons of around 15 or more USVs, each equipped to field a minimum swarm of at least ten vessels. These would be supported by a small command team, a Portable Operations Centre (POC), maintenance personnel and a compact logistics element.
The control system would be as important as the boats themselves. POCs could be dispersed or moved at short notice, avoiding dependence on a single shore facility. POCs could also be embarked aboard OPVs, RFAs, motherships or other vessels of opportunity. The POC concept is already established in RN service to support autonomous minehunting operations and could be adapted for a broader coastal surveillance role.
When a Russian warship or vessel of interest entered waters close to the UK, several Scouts could be launched to supplement, or occasionally provide temporary relief for, the crewed ship normally assigned to shadow it. A flotilla of USVs would provide a flexible and scalable response. The initial intention would not be to aggressively swarm at close range. One or two USVs could monitor a vessel from a discreet distance of at least 1km away in much the same way as a crewed patrol ship would.
There is a fine line between harassment of vessels exercising lawful navigation and reacting to behaviour outside maritime norms. The flotilla would operate within existing international law and follow the same navigation rules as RN vessels. If Russian activity became more belligerent, such as conducting live firing in the English Channel, the warship could quickly find itself more closely accompanied by ten or more USVs.
Provided there remained ambiguity over whether any of the craft might be carrying a 600kg warhead for a one-way attack mission, their presence would significantly complicate decision-making for an adversary. Russian sailors have extensive first-hand experience of what armed USVs can do to conventional warships. Every minute spent monitoring the USVs diverts attention and imposes a meaningful operational burden without necessarily breaching accepted rules for shadowing a foreign warship.
The Russian first response would likely be attempts to jam the USVs’ data links. The flotilla would need jam-resistant and redundant communications pathways as well as autonomous navigation and fail-safe behaviours to allow safe return to base if communications are disrupted. If the response was to attempt to destroy USVs with gunfire, an attack on an RN vessel, even an unmanned craft operating lawfully in international waters, would itself represent a significant escalation, exposing Russian intent and forcing a political response.
Scout K3 can remain operationally useful in conditions up to about sea state 4. In the English Channel and southern North Sea, sea states above 4 are only prevalent for about 20% of the year, although in the northern North Sea and waters off the West of Scotland it’s closer to 40%. The USV flotilla is not a panacea and would obviously be constrained by weather conditions at times, but would be a big force multiplier that would supplement the conventional all-weather surveillance assets (Navy Lookout mock-up).
The challenges
The three main obstacles to implementing this vision concern safety, weather limitations and command and control.
Collision avoidance, communications procedures, identification and responsibility for navigation would all need to be clearly defined. The safety case would have to demonstrate that a communications failure, software fault or navigation error could not place other mariners at unacceptable risk. Military vessels do not always fall neatly within civilian regulatory structures, but operations in busy UK waters would still require close co-ordination with the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA), harbour authorities and coastguard services.
A reminder of what can go wrong came in June 2026, when a small RN Ratter USV collided with the 55ft yacht Lutine inside Portsmouth Harbour. The experimental drone boat reportedly ‘went rogue’ during a controlled training exercise and caused significant damage to the yacht. Reliable and fail-safe control technology is approaching maturity, but procedures, command arrangements and regulatory oversight still require further development. The safety of mariners remains paramount, but civilian regulators must be subservient to national security requirements.
The regulatory environment for maritime autonomous systems is developing rapidly. This month, the IMO published the first international Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships Code, with the MCA playing a prominent role in its development. The MCA also opened a Maritime Innovation Hub in June to help operators navigate the safety-case process for autonomous trials and new vessel designs. Developing a coastal USV flotilla would provide a useful practical test, exposing the remaining regulatory and doctrinal obstacles that require rapid resolution.
Affordable, scalable, effective
This concept is not on the same level of complexity as Atlantic Bastion or the Type 9X uncrewed platform concepts, which will have to operate for long periods far out into the ocean. A coastal flotilla would remain relatively close to UK ports and rely on small, commercially derived boats rather than much larger and more complex uncrewed mini warships.
The system would be affordable enough to purchase in meaningful numbers, scalable according to the level of threat, and low risk because no sailors would be placed directly in harm’s way. Yet its visible operational effect could be disproportionate to its cost, particularly when confronting an adversary already highly sensitive to the presence of small USVs.
A single new OPV could cost at least £50M to build, plus significant through-life support costs and require a crew of about 40, while Scout K3 requires no crew and only a small shore support team. Many USVs could be acquired and operated for the cost of a single OPV. This is particularly relevant because the River-class Batch 1 OPVs leave service from 2028, with no replacements planned.
A coastal flotilla would also provide another operational step towards the RN’s Hybrid Navy vision. It could deliver real effect in the near term, while generating experience in distributed command, autonomous navigation, communications resilience, maintenance and safety regulation. Unlike many future concepts, its presence would be highly visible to the public, allies and adversaries. It would demonstrate that the RN was finally beginning to use uncrewed systems to regain the initiative rather than merely discussing their potential.
The underlying idea is not entirely new. The IRGC has massed small boats to threaten warships in the Persian Gulf for several decades, while Ukraine has perfected the uncrewed vessel as a means of direct attack. A ‘deterrence flotilla’ of USVs employed primarily for monitoring and pressure would nevertheless be relatively novel. It would not replace conventional warships, nor would it solve every weakness in the RN’s home-waters posture, but it could force Russian commanders to take British responses more seriously and place the service back on the front foot.
Main image: Navy Lookout mock-up.
