FIFA, world football’s governing body, sparked controversy last week when it provided updated ticket prices for next summer’s World Cup in the United States, Canada and Mexico.
A leading European fans group called the prices a “betrayal”. Others opted for “despicable”.
The easy thing to do is to label it an act of opportunistic wealth-hoarding and, in step with that, a sign of both moral decay and the ceaseless pursuit of profit in the sport.
Yet FIFA is, by design, a non-profit organisation. It has no shareholders and is ‘owned’ by its 211 constituent member associations. There is no one to pay dividends to; FIFA’s own most recent annual report says the body ‘ploughs the vast majority of its revenue directly back into football, in line with its statutory objectives’.
Naturally, that leads us to wonder why it has chosen to bump up prices so significantly. Is it avarice or essential? Greed or need?
Getting a handle on FIFA’s finances isn’t the easiest, and not because they’re particularly opaque about them. As a not-for-profit, it releases far more detail around expenditure than we’re used to seeing from clubs, or indeed the member associations that collectively determine who to put in charge of the governing body.
Instead, it’s because FIFA’s financial model works in four-year cycles, each tethered to the flagship World Cup finals. In simple terms, FIFA loses big money in three years out of four and then, in every fourth year, offsets it (and beyond) with a massive surplus driven by the World Cup. In the 2019-22 cycle, FIFA’s combined surplus was $1.187billion (£890m), with $2.368bn generated in 2022 on the back of the Qatar World Cup.
That was the second cycle running the organisation had banked a $1.2billion surplus, and successive cycles of doing so left FIFA with $3.971bn in reserves at the end of 2022. A further, albeit much smaller, surplus is forecast for the current cycle ending in 2026, which, if achieved, will tip reserves over the $4bn mark.
FIFA’s operations are mammoth, so carrying noteworthy reserves is understandable. Yet $4billion is a big amount. Sources with an understanding of FIFA’s operations, who asked to be kept anonymous to protect relationships, told The Athletic the governing body is keen to hold such large amounts of reserves in the event of force majeure occurrences.
An example of one of those came in 2020 when the Covid-19 pandemic brought the world to a stop. FIFA quickly moved to offer up to $1.5billion under its ‘Covid-19 Relief Plan’. Though the eventual amount doled out ended up being short of that figure, the offer itself was made possible by the organisation’s hefty reserves pile.
If there were future disruptions, insufficient FIFA reserves would lead to national associations going bust. It is unclear at what point FIFA will deem reserves to be too high and become willing to accept an annual deficit if it means pumping more money into the game. Those same sources said FIFA’s reserves position is “continuously reviewed” and the organisation has to take “a long-term view” of such matters.
Quite obviously, we can’t know exactly what FIFA’s finances will turn out like at the end of the ongoing 2023-26 cycle, but the budget put forth a few years ago was instructive.
In that, FIFA set itself the aim of generating $11billion in revenue, a figure that, at a meeting of the FIFA Council back in March 2024, president Gianni Infantino announced the body was already “well on track to exceed”.
That budget, agreed in 2023, did not account for FIFA’s bumper new version of its Club World Cup, hosted across the U.S. in the summer. Its formulation led to a revised budget being approved at this year’s FIFA Congress in May, with revenue and expenditure bumped up by $2billion in line with the Club World Cup being ‘financially neutral’. It means FIFA’s budgeted revenues for 2023-26 are now $13bn, over $5.4bn (72 per cent) higher than the previous cycle.
Within those revenues, $3.097billion has been budgeted in income from hospitality rights and ticket sales. It comprises a more than $2bn increase on 2019-22, when Qatar World Cup ticket sales of $685.9million comprised over 70 per cent of income from hospitality and tickets.
A source with knowledge of FIFA’s current budget, speaking anonymously as they did not have permission to discuss matters publicly, advised The Athletic that the historic split of income within that revenue stream is expected to continue. That means, if budgeted figures are achieved and tickets comprise around 70 per cent of the revenue line, FIFA will book over $2.1billion in ticketing revenue for the 2023-26 cycle.
That represents a more than tripling of ticket sales from the last four-year cycle, reflecting those high ticket prices, but it is also worth remembering there will be 40 more games in this summer’s World Cup than the last, and games will generally be played in stadia with higher capacities than in Qatar.
Hospitality and ticketing income is budgeted to comprise 28 per cent of FIFA’s 2023-26 revenue, more than double the proportion of previous cycles. Where in those past periods $1billion-plus surpluses were recorded, FIFA has budgeted for a much smaller $100m surplus in this cycle. It means less room for error in missing revenue targets.
The original 2023-26 budget highlighted hospitality sales as a driver in the increase, citing “the strategic model in operation, which has moved away from the rights-fee model, under which FIFA’s hospitality services were outsourced”. In essence, FIFA had opted to bring those services in-house for the upcoming World Cup, recognising the “attractive hospitality features already embedded in the modern stadiums” that will host games next summer.
It seems strange, then, that in the revised budget, FIFA confirmed it had “reverted to a royalty model, with hospitality services outsourced”, even as that $3.097billion in budgeted income didn’t change. If a primary factor driving the big increase from 2019-22 was bringing hospitality in-house, it is difficult to understand how that revenue number hasn’t moved when that decision has since been reversed.
It is not the case, either, that no other revenue lines changed in the revised budget. Alongside the $2billion in revenue attributable to the Club World Cup, FIFA downgraded this cycle’s licensing rights income by $269m, to $400m, a shortfall that was made up by upgrades in expected marketing revenues and miscellaneous other income.
That tracks to FIFA’s 2023 accounts, where marketing income was $229million higher than budgeted that year. In 2024, marketing income was a further $167m better than budget. It stands to reason this excess is used to offset lost licensing income across the four-year cycle.
Yet, of further curiosity regarding that hospitality and ticketing revenue stream is that the return to outsourcing hospitality services was very much reflected on the expenditure side of the ledger.
In FIFA’s original 2023-26 budget, hospitality costs for the 2026 World Cup were projected to hit $638million. At 17 per cent of the $3.839bn investment budget for the tournament, hospitality costs were the second-highest outgoing for FIFA, only trailing $896m in prize money and payments to the club benefits programme (CBP, which gives clubs a fee for their players participating in the tournament).
Yet in the revised budget approved this year, FIFA’s hospitality costs for the World Cup had plummeted, down 94 per cent to just $36million. A return to outsourcing is always likely to reduce costs, but the expectation would be that revenue would diminish, too, as a third party would now assume its slice of the income.
That it has not is perplexing. FIFA’s budget does not break down the split of projected hospitality rights and ticketing income, so we can’t see how much was attributable to each in either budget document. But if FIFA expects to retain the same level of income despite a return to outsourcing, one of two things must have changed: either the amounts expected to be generated from hospitality are far greater than previously thought, even with the royalty model (ie, outsourcing) restored, or budgeted income from ticket sales has increased.
In response to queries from The Athletic about whether the unchanged revenue figure was because reduced hospitality takings were being made up through other means, FIFA did not provide an official response.
One source with knowledge of the matter, speaking anonymously to protect relationships, said that ticket sales were not compensating for any reduced revenues elsewhere, and that FIFA’s aim was to “improve all sources of income, to then develop football further”.
The source also highlighted that, irrespective of ticket sales, FIFA’s other revenues could be ahead of budget too, and results from 2023 and 2024 — like that impressive marketing income — bear that out. Across those two seasons, FIFA’s net result before taxes and any financial income or costs was over $500million ahead of the original budget position. The implication is that high ticket prices were already baked into this cycle’s projections.
FIFA takes in a huge amount of cash, but, obeying that not-for-profit ethos, it disburses an awful lot too.
That point was underlined this week, as the FIFA Council approved a record prize fund for nations competing in the upcoming World Cup. Across prize money, preparation money and the enhanced CBP, FIFA will pay out $1.082billion next summer, a $433m (and 67 per cent) increase on Qatar 2022.
In the revised budget for next year’s World Cup, the extra $111million (now an extra $186m, following this week’s announcement) allocated to participating nations and the clubs of their players was one of the main areas the $602m in hospitality cost savings were directed. The only budget line to see more allocated to it between the revised and original budgets was ‘Stadiums and training sites’, meaning those to be used during the tournament. They were not mentioned in the original World Cup budget but are now slated to receive $201m in FIFA investment.
One of the defining aspects of Infantino’s reign has been an increase in payments made to football’s various associations. Since FIFA’s ‘Forward Programme’ replaced the ‘Financial Assistance Programme’ (FAP) in place before Infantino’s election, such payments have almost quadrupled, from $598million via FAP in the 2011-14 cycle to a budgeted $2.25bn in the current one.
All of which is to say that, while FIFA under Infantino is a revenue-generating juggernaut, it has also committed to making big payments beyond its own doors.
It is notable that in the revised 2023-26 budget, in-house salaries at FIFA were reduced by $61million and, while some internal budgets did receive extra funds, reallocated monies were overwhelmingly directed toward third parties like those mentioned above.
Whether FIFA needs the money that will inevitably flow from sky-high ticket prices is a matter for debate. Having already tweaked prices in response to the backlash, albeit for only a tiny tranche of tickets, there’s evidently some scope for them to reduce takings. Running well ahead of budget in the first two years of this cycle hardly points to an organisation desperate for the cash.
At the same time, there’s an argument that FIFA earning as much as it possibly can is good for football, provided the money goes where we are told it will. With FIFA’s stated aim of recycling almost all of its income back into the game, more money for FIFA equals more for the sport. Already, we know next year will see record distributions to participating nations, clubs that release players for World Cup duty and for the multitude of associations that sit under FIFA’s worldwide banner.
To underline the importance of those distributions, a FIFA spokesperson told The Athletic that “without FIFA’s financial support, more than 50 per cent of FIFA’s member associations could not operate.”
Separately, and as articulated already elsewhere, there’s the argument that if FIFA didn’t charge high prices, someone else would. The U.S.’s deregulated secondary market is catnip for touts and scalpers; better for FIFA to charge the prices at source and use it to further fund football.
Moreover, the U.S. really does represent a land of opportunity. Sports fans there will routinely pay more than their western European counterparts. It might leave a sour taste, but there’s an argument that FIFA not cashing in when it can means not generating the most it possibly can to recycle back into the sport. It may be that the spiralling prices we’re now seeing are a chance FIFA feels it would be ill-judged to pass up.
Echoing that sentiment, a FIFA spokesperson said: “The pricing model for FIFA World Cup 2026 reflects the existing market practice for major entertainment and sporting events [in our host countries], soccer included. It is also a reflection of the secondary market for tickets, which has distinct legal treatment [in the United States].”
“We are focused on ensuring fair access to our game for existing but also prospective fans.”
It may simply be that the governing body still needs the money to meet its commitments. Despite 2023 and 2024 running well ahead of forecast, the revised budget did not increase the expected surplus for 2023-26. More funds have been allocated to associations and clubs instead. Whether it would have been better to use any extra money to reduce ticket prices is open to debate; FIFA evidently opted not to.
FIFA under Infantino has proved a boon to football associations across the world, and promises need to be kept. We won’t know the exact finances of the 2023-26 cycle until well into 2027, but that revised budget throws up intrigue.
Notwithstanding the reversion to an outsourced hospitality service having no impact on that revenue stream in the budget, signs point to high ticket prices for the next World Cup as always being a part of the financial plan.
Alongside an apparent desire to retain high levels of reserves, FIFA continues to promise to pay out big sums to member associations. It is a theme which shows little sign of changing — and it means, whether viewed as fair or not on fans, football’s overarching governing body needs to take in as much revenue as it can muster.
