By Jonathan TironeRaeedah WahidHayley WarrenRachel Lavin February 26, 2026
President Donald Trump said this week the US would “easily” prevail in any military confrontation with Iran. Recent activity on the ground in the Islamic Republic, though, indicates any victory might be short-lived.
Satellite images suggest the Pentagon would confront an adversary focused on preserving its most critical military and nuclear capabilities. Photographs taken this month show Iranian engineers clearing debris at nuclear facilities damaged during last June’s 12-day conflict with the US and Israel while reinforcing key sites against future attack.
US and Iranian diplomats gathered on Thursday in Geneva for what they described as a last-ditch effort to avert renewed hostilities, and both sides have said they want a deal. Iran said the talks progressed “very intensely and very seriously.” If negotiations collapse, Trump has signaled he’s prepared to escalate, backed by what officials describe as the largest US military buildup in the Middle East in more than two decades.
Yet should he pull the trigger, military planners would face a dispersed and partially concealed set of targets because of Iran’s rugged geography. The scale of their task would be compounded by reduced international monitoring and the limits of even the most powerful conventional munitions.
The commercial satellite images illustrate what non-proliferation specialists say is the central challenge to Trump’s potential intervention: US air power can destroy buildings, but it cannot eliminate scientific expertise, stockpiled material or the political will to rebuild.
Iran’s Largest Nuclear Research Complex in Isfahan
Before inspections were curtailed, the International Atomic Energy Agency reported Iran had accumulated sufficient highly enriched uranium for about a dozen nuclear devices. The status and location of that material haven’t been independently verified for more than eight months after Iran suspended IAEA access to the bombed sites.
While Iran’s most sensitive material is widely believed to be stored in hardened underground facilities, only on-site inspections could confirm it hasn’t been moved or diverted.
“The hardening against attack demonstrates resilience,” said Darya Dolzikova, a senior non-proliferation researcher at the Royal United Services Institute in London. “This is a country that can rebuild if it wants to.”
Images indicate multiple tunnel entrances near the Isfahan nuclear complex have been backfilled — a step analysts say is designed to prevent collapse from potential airstrikes and to seal access points vulnerable to penetration munitions.
Sources: Satellite image ©2026 Vantor; Institute for Science and International Security
The most pressing issue remains Iran’s nuclear program. The White House has repeated that Iran’s capacity to manufacture nuclear fuel was “obliterated.” Tehran, though, retains stockpiles of enriched uranium that, if further processed, could be used for weapons.
“They were warned to make no future attempts to rebuild their weapons program, in particular, nuclear weapons,” Trump said on Tuesday in his State of the Union address. “Yet they continue. They’re starting it all over. We wiped it out, and they want to start all over again and are at this moment again pursuing their sinister ambitions.”
Uranium Enrichment Facility in Natanz
Iran’s subsequent curtailment of IAEA access has widened intelligence gaps. Without inspectors on the ground, outside governments have limited ability to assess whether the centrifuges used to enrich uranium were destroyed, relocated or removed in advance. That uncertainty complicates both targeting decisions and post-strike battle damage assessments.
Even if known facilities were rendered inoperable, analysts say Tehran could reconstitute enrichment elsewhere. Unlike Iraq’s Osirak or Syria’s Al-Kibar reactor, inoperable reactors destroyed by Israel in 1981 and 2007, Iran’s program is industrial in scale and supported by decades of accumulated expertise.
“If the goal is reconstitution by using what they have saved, it is easy,” said Robert Kelley, a former US Energy Department official and ex-IAEA director who helped dismantle nuclear weapons programs in Iraq, Libya and South Africa.
A relatively small number of advanced centrifuges can be configured to enrich Iran’s uranium to weapons grade if feedstock is available, he said.
Imagery shows reconstruction at Natanz, including a new roof over a damaged pilot fuel enrichment plant used to test advanced centrifuges. Significant uncertainty remains about subterranean infrastructure, including electrical systems critical to enrichment.
Other images show reinforcement work at Pickaxe Mountain, a suspected third enrichment site southwest of Natanz. Two tunnel entrances to Pickaxe Mountain have been extended and are being covered by gravel and sand.
Sources: Satellite image ©2026 Vantor; Institute for Science and International Security; Center for Strategic and International Studies; OpenStreetMap
Iran previously announced preparations for an additional enrichment location, though inspectors were unable to verify it before hostilities began. The existence of such facilities underscores another challenge: the possibility of covert or partially completed sites beyond the known inventory.
Operation Midnight Hammer — the US bombing campaign launched on June 22 — involved B-2 airplanes dropping 30,000-pound (13,600-kilogram) GBU-57 bunker-busting bombs on enrichment facilities at Fordow and Natanz.
The GBU-57 is designed to penetrate reinforced concrete and layers of earth before detonating. Satellite pictures show extensive surface damage, but the extent of destruction to deeply buried centrifuge halls remains uncertain.
Facilities such as Fordow are embedded under mountains, with some estimates placing key chambers tens of meters below rock. Even heavy earth-penetrating munitions have limits, particularly against sites excavated into hard geological formations. Completely collapsing such complexes could require repeated strikes or ground operations — options that carry greater escalation risks and political costs.
Kelley said satellite analysis suggests the US may have used only two GBU-57 bombs against one underground hall at Natanz, and crater patterns indicate one may not have detonated as intended. While imagery can reveal blast scars and debris fields, it cannot determine whether cascades deep underground remain repairable.
Parchin Military Reservation
The diplomatic dispute extends beyond uranium enrichment. While Tehran says talks must be limited to nuclear constraints in exchange for sanctions relief, the Trump administration has demanded verifiable limits on Iran’s ballistic missile production. That widens the potential target list in the event of renewed conflict to include industrial sites tied to conventional weapons.
Among the most sensitive is the Parchin military complex southeast of Tehran, a 52-square-kilometer (20-square-mile) facility long associated with high-explosives testing. Resolving questions about past weapons-related research at Parchin was central to the 2015 nuclear accord between Iran and world powers, an agreement Trump exited during his first term.
Recent images show additional fortification of a structure at the Taleghan-2 site within Parchin. Analysts at the Institute for Science and International Security have said the facility likely has “strategic significance.” Engineers appear to have covered its concrete protective shell with earth, creating a camouflaged bunker.
Sources: Satellite image ©2026 Vantor; Institute for Science and International Security; Copernicus Sentinel-2; OpenStreetMap
Blast chambers at Parchin can be used for conventional munitions testing but are also relevant to experiments involving explosive compression, a key component of nuclear weapons design.
“Iran is engaged in hardening this building against future attacks, suggesting it is important to some programs,” said Kelley, adding that airstrikes alone may be able to set a program back, but not decisively end it.
Modern Missile Manufacturing Facility at Khojir
Iran’s geography compounds the challenge. The country spans roughly 1.6 million square kilometers — about twice the size of Texas — with mountainous terrain suited to tunneling, dispersal and concealment. Its missile-production infrastructure illustrates the scale.
The Khojir complex east of Tehran, near the 2,108-meter Kuh-e Barjamali peak, is a sprawling industrial site critical to supplying fuel and components for ballistic missiles. Images show buildings separated by berms and blast walls designed to prevent chain reactions from explosions. Eliminating such capacity would likely require repeated strikes.
Even sustained air campaigns may only delay, rather than eliminate, missile production. And expanding the target set risks retaliation across the region.
Sources: Planet Labs; Copernicus Sentinel-2; OpenStreetMap
Iran maintains ties to armed groups in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen capable of targeting US forces, Gulf energy infrastructure or commercial shipping. Disruption in the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20% of the world’s oil and oil products flow, could send energy prices sharply higher.
Military action also carries political consequences inside Iran. Previous confrontations have tended to strengthen hardline factions. Strikes could accelerate rather than halt a decision to produce nuclear weapons should leaders conclude deterrence is required for self-preservation.
“Military action is not decisively effective as a counter-proliferation strategy,” Dolzikova said. “It can delay. It rarely eliminates.”
Updates to add progress of talks in 3rd paragraph. An earlier version corrected the location of a nuclear reactor.
Edited by Rodney JeffersonMichael Ovaska
