The Case That Supports A United-American Airlines Merger

Statements from United Airlines CEO, Scott Kirby this week about a merger with American Airlines caused significant uproar but there is a case that supports the tie-up.
Kirby’s Outlandish Proposal
United isn’t just posturing anymore. The idea of a merger or outright acquisition of American Airlines is being floated, and though American rejected the notion, it should make travelers very uncomfortable. United Airlines sees an opportunity in a weakened rival, and similarly, an opportunity with an administration that loves landmark deals, announcements, and surprising the public. But consolidation at this scale has never ended well for consumers. Fewer choices, higher fares, and a loyalty ecosystem that tilts even further against the customer is the likely outcome. Regulators will have to decide if this is efficiency or simply market power dressed up as strategy. Whether it was conjecture, a strategic move to get a smaller deal done, or just to annoy the company that fired him, this is the kind of move that would reshape the industry overnight.
A Case That Supports The Merger
There is a case that supports such a merger, as absurdly large as it may be, but not in a vacuum. Give me a wide berth on this.
US carriers have fewer seats from the greater New York market (including Newark) to London than British carriers and twice the competitors domestically. New York to Paris is drowning in Air France seats more than all US carriers combined by a hefty margin. Los Angeles to Tokyo is owned by the foreign carriers – even often forgotten about ZIPAIR has more seats (though the breakdown is quite different) than American or Delta.
New York Area (JFK/EWR) to Paris (CDG/ORY) Daily Capacity
Scheduled Capacity for April/Summer 2026
Airline
Daily Flights
Daily Seats (Approx.)
Primary Aircraft
Route
Carrier Type
Air France
8–11
2,200 – 3,000
Boeing 777-300ER / Airbus A350-900
JFK/EWR – CDG
Foreign Legacy
Delta Air Lines
3
843
Airbus A330-900neo
JFK – CDG
U.S. Legacy
United Airlines
2
514
Boeing 777-200 / 767-400ER
EWR – CDG
U.S. Legacy
French bee
1
411
Airbus A350-900
EWR – ORY
Foreign Low-Cost
Norse Atlantic
1
338
Boeing 787-9
JFK – CDG
Foreign Low-Cost
American Airlines
1
304
Boeing 777-300ER
JFK – CDG
U.S. Legacy
JetBlue
1
138
Airbus A321LR
JFK – CDG
U.S. Hybrid
La Compagnie
1–2
76 – 152
Airbus A321neo
EWR – ORY
Boutique (All-Biz)
TOTAL
~20
~5,300+
US Carriers vs. Foreign Carriers: Daily Capacity (LAX to Tokyo)
Consolidated Daily Schedule for April 2026 (LAX to HND/NRT)
Carrier Group
Airline
Daily Flights
Daily Seats
Primary Market Focus
Foreign Carriers
ANA (All Nippon)
3
730
“The Room” Business / HND-NRT Split
JAL (Japan Airlines)
3
715
Premium Service / 2-4-2 Economy
Singapore Airlines
1
350
Ultra-Luxury / 5th Freedom (NRT)
ZIPAIR Tokyo
1
290
Low-Cost / Lie-flat Hybrid
Foreign Total
8
2,085
67% Market Share
U.S. Carriers
United Airlines
2
514
Multi-Airport Connectivity (HND/NRT)
Delta Air Lines
1
281
Delta One Suites (HND)
American Airlines
1
244
High-yield Business (HND)
U.S. Total
4
1,039
33% Market Share
That’s not without caveats, of course, American has a joint venture with British Airways across the Atlantic and benefits from nearly daylight shuttle service to London. Delta has the same with Virgin Atlantic to London, Air France to Paris. United has a join venture with ANA to Tokyo, and American has one with Japan Airlines. While the flights might be operated by a foreign carrier, they can still be sold and utilized as though they are the same operation. This pokes holes in the notion that American carriers are losing to foreign ones in these key markets. They aren’t, they are operating in sanctioned coordination with them.
Where the argument does have legs could be seen as semantical rather than material. British Airways now flies to 19 US destinations that are not American Airlines hub cities. If we exclude oneworld hubs, the number drops to 17 as Alaska operates in Seattle and Portland. Because the United Kingdom is a smaller country than the United States with just 20% of the population, US carriers only return the favor to a pair of destinations including Edinburgh, Glasgow. The story is similar in France, with Air France flying nonstop to 15 destinations outside of Delta hubs. Delta is the only carrier flying to any other city in France, Nice, from the United States. And it goes on and on across Europe, South America, and examples in Japan are similar though to a lesser degree.
Those points on the map eat into US carriers connecting traffic too. For the origin and destination traffic, the answer is a little more obvious; Londoners wishing to visit Nashville or New Orleans will avoid connections, and the same is true for their US counterparts heading to London. But the real threat is those who connect onward to other points in Europe. They could do this on US carriers too, but many destinations would require a second stop, once from Nashville to New York, another to Paris before arriving in Lyon or Budapest for example.
But the US air market is too large and lucrative for one super carrier to solve this problem.
Practical Implementation
United and American together would control far too much to approve, but if Delta paired up with Alaska too, and maybe JetBlue there would be two large US super carriers that still compete against each other. That combination would have similar domestic market share as the United-American merger. Southwest, Breeze, Allegiant, Frontier, and Spirit (if it makes it) could still apply pricing pressure at home. The combined carriers would have the ability to save money with combined stations and staff, better allocate seats, lounge space, invest more in their product, expansion and utilize their fleet better.
That combination also prevents the more significant risk that American never pays its mountain of debt, the same would be true of JetBlue which is having trouble at the moment. Alaska and Delta had a frenemy relationship for years that has vaulted into an all-out battle in Seattle, but faced with an existential crisis (especially if United-American was Star Alliance) they may bury the hatchet.
While this may seem outlandish, consider that two carriers, JetBlue, and Spirit have an unsustainable financial outlook. Frontier is not significantly better. In 2008, United and Continental merged, closing the deal two years later. Delta and Northwest followed in 2012, American merged with US Airways in 2013. In a span of three years, six US flag carriers became three. There’s precedence for this type of consolidation. It might not be good for US consumers, but in the case of JetBlue and Spirit, job losses and competition matter too. American’s finances are precarious and it may be a real risk that the carrier in its current form can weather many more years of negligible profit or significant loss.
Bad Idea, Don’t Do It
The combined entities may, in fact, be better equipped to fight foreign carriers invading US markets but that assumes that the US responds by offering more direct flights to foreign nations. It also presumes that foreign carriers don’t seek greater alignment with each other as Air France/KLM have done. IAG already owns Iberia, and Aer Lingus for example.
Either outcome would likely be atrocious for domestic flight costs. Southwest and the discounters don’t have the capital and the equipment to compete with either one or two behemoths. They wouldn’t be able to match the fleets, seats, or renewed cost savings and richer bank deals for combined entities of this size.
It would also shift the alliance strength that has been a stabilizing force across the industry over the last few years. If United-American were to transition to Star Alliance, oneworld would be left with just Alaska, entirely insufficient for the market size. And if it were to go to oneworld (unlikely because United’s balance sheet would likely leave its management in place), Star Alliance would lose a homefield advantage in the largest air market in the world. Just Air Canada would be the sole carrier north of Salvador in the Star Alliance. Both United and American were founding members of their respective alliances.
Conclusion
Some have speculated that Kirby’s remarks were motivated to get back at the airline that fired him, but if that was the case, it backfired as American stock rose, not fell on the news. Others have said (as I initially thought) that it was a case of “Shoot for the moon so you can hit the ceiling” approach to clear the way for a JetBlue acquisition. That still might be the case. But with time, I think he might have seen this as a genuine, once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to build a truly historic carrier. The Trump administration loves big deals, surprising the public, and unconventional approaches. It’s also unabashedly America first, and the objections from foreign carriers would likely encourage the administration not counter its ambitions. But whether just United-American or a Delta combination too, this would be disastrous for US consumers and potentially for the global aviation community.
What do you think? Could United-American happen if there’s a counter balance merger?
Get Daily Updates
Join our mailing list for a daily summary of posts! We never sell your info.
You have Successfully Subscribed!




