A ruling for the Jefferson County School Board of Education in a pending KY Supreme Court case wouldn’t invalidate the merged Metro Government, but what about occupational tax and TIFS?
| Opinion Contributor
JCPS will be ‘crumbling’ if problems not solved, says superintendent
JCPS superintendent Brian Yearwood talks with parents, teachers and students at public forum about proposed closure of three schools.
- A Kentucky state statute that would give the JCPS superintendent more authority is currently being challenged in the state Supreme Court.
- The Jefferson County Board of Education argues the statute is unconstitutional because it only applies to Jefferson County.
- A ruling against the statute could potentially invalidate other laws specific to Louisville and Jefferson County, such as certain tax laws.
- The Kentucky Supreme Court has previously upheld Louisville-specific statutes, recognizing the unique issues of the state’s most populous county.
Can JCPS be governed effectively?
David A Jones Jr.’s Oct. 14 op-ed makes a persuasive argument in favor of the 2022 state statute that would reform the governance of JCPS by granting more managerial authority to the superintendent.
But, as Jones pointed out, the constitutionality of that statute is presently pending before the Kentucky Supreme Court because it applies only in Jefferson County. Louisvillians should be especially concerned about the potential consequences of a decision in that case for other laws specific to Louisville and Jefferson County.
Two recent guest editorials debated that question. One editorial argued that a decision striking down the statute could render several other Louisville-specific statutes invalid, including the merger of the City of Louisville and Jefferson County governments. The other editorial strongly disagreed.
Each editorial is half-right and half-wrong. Here’s why.
Nemes argues if the JCPS statue is unconstitutional, so is the city-county merger
The school governance statute at issue applies only to Kentucky school boards in a county having a consolidated local government. The merger of Louisville and Jefferson County is the only such local government. Consequently, the statute presently applies only to JCPS. The Jefferson County Board of Education contends the statute, therefore, violates the prohibition against “special or local” legislation in the state Constitution.
The state Supreme Court initially ruled against the board and upheld the statute. But, after a change in its membership, the Court voted 4-3 to reconsider that decision. The Court recently heard counsel’s arguments, and a decision is forthcoming soon.
Rep. Jason Nemes argued in his editorial that, if the JCPS statute is unconstitutional as local legislation, then the statute that authorized city-county merger is likewise unconstitutional because that statute also applies only to Louisville and Jefferson County. Nemes also argued that the statute authorizing only one school board — JCPS — to levy an occupational tax, and the statute authorizing tax increment financing (TIF) in a single area of Louisville, are unconstitutional if all Louisville-specific statutes are unconstitutional. He has a point, up to a point.
School board members counter Nemes’ argument
In a response editorial, the chair and vice chair of the Jefferson County Board of Education argued that a separate provision of the state Constitution solves any problem with the JCPS occupational tax and the Louisville West End TIF. But if that constitutional provision was a panacea for all Louisville-specific legislation, there would be no question that the school governance statute applying only to JCPS is also not unconstitutional.
In fact, the constitutional provision the board members cite applies only to those local-specific statutes which relate to the creation and powers of cities. The Board of Education is not a city. So, that provision does not protect the statute changing the governance of JCPS against the board’s challenge that the statute is unconstitutional “special or local” legislation.
Both sides have valid points
The board’s officers also argue — correctly — that the statute authorizing the merger of the City of Louisville and Jefferson County does, indeed, relate to the organization and powers of city government. So, a ruling for the board in the pending case would not invalidate the merged Metro Government.
But what about the occupational tax levied by JCPS? That statute applies only to school boards located in a county having a population in excess of 300,000 people. When it was enacted in 1990, Jefferson County was the only such Kentucky county. Under the board’s argument in the pending case, the statute was unconstitutional local legislation when enacted because it applied only to Jefferson County schools. Since 1990, Fayette County’s population has exceeded 300,000. So, is a statute that applies now to two, but only two, school boards constitutional, but was unconstitutional when it applied only to one?
And what about Louisville’s West End TIF? The state statute creating that TIF precisely describes its boundaries with reference to specified local landmarks. There is not now, and never will be, another local area in Kentucky that qualifies for the particular tax abatement provided by that particular statute. The board contends in the pending state Supreme Court case that a statute is unconstitutional if it presently applies to only one Kentucky locale, and if it is unlikely to ever apply to another locale. The TIF would, therefore, be imperiled by a decision adopting the Board of Education’s argument.
Louisville problems can and will vary from those of the rest of Kentucky
The state Supreme Court has, for over a century, upheld a multitude of Louisville-specific statutes, deciding that the legislature may address problems specific to Kentucky’s most populous county and its only first-class city. Indeed, one of those decisions upheld the 1971 statute giving the merged city-county Board of Education, and only the Jefferson County Board of Education, seven members rather than five, as provided by the general statute applicable to all other Kentucky school boards.
Whether the Supreme Court upholds the new school management statute or strikes it down, Louisvillians should hope the Court’s opinion preserves the authority of the legislature to enact statutes addressing problems specific to Louisville and Jefferson County.
Sheryl G. Snyder is a Louisville lawyer. He has represented several Kentucky governors in cases before the state Supreme Court involving the Constitution of Kentucky.
