Toplines
The rate of protests across Iran declined slightly on January 5 and 6 compared to the rate of protests between January 2 and 4. CTP-ISW recorded at least 43 protests across Iran between January 5 at 2 PM ET and January 6 at 2 PM ET, and 37 protests between January 4 at 2 PM ET and January 5 at 2 PM ET.[1] The day-by-day breakdown of protests since January 1 illustrates that the protest rate has declined since January 4 at 2 PM ET:[2]
· 81 protests occurred across 23 provinces between January 3 at 2 PM ET and January 4 at 2 PM ET.
· 62 protests occurred across 18 provinces between January 2 at 2 PM ET and January 3 at 2 PM ET.
· 70 protests occurred across 22 provinces between January 1 at 2 PM ET and January 2 at 2 PM ET.
The Iranian weekend — which is on Friday and Saturday — may have driven the higher rate of protests from Friday, January 2, to Sunday, January 4. CTP-ISW observed an increase in protests across Tehran on January 5 and 6, in contrast to the declining national rate on January 5 and January 6. Nineteen protests took place in Tehran between January 5 and 6, while only eight protests occurred in Tehran between January 4 and 5.[3] A medium sized protest occurred in Abadan, Ilam Province, during which Iranian Law Enforcement Command personnel waved at protesters from the rooftop of a nearby police building.[4] Iranian authorities have arrested nearly 1,000 people and killed at least 25 people, including four minors, since the protests started on December 28, according to a Norway-based Kurdish Iranian rights group.[5] CTP-ISW has not observed a demographic or geographic change in protests since its last data cutoff at 2 PM ET on January 5.
The Iranian regime warned on January 6 that it would take unspecified preemptive measures to counter any US and/or Israeli attempts to exploit the ongoing protests across Iran that threaten Iranian regime security, almost certainly to deter US and Israeli activity against Iran.[6] The Defense Council condemned Iran’s adversaries’ “intensifying threatening language and interventionist threats” on January 6 in the council’s first official statement since its establishment in August 2025.[7] The council is presumably referring to US President Donald Trump’s January 2 warnings that the United States could intervene if Iranian security forces shoot or kill Iranian protesters.[8] Iran’s highest national security and foreign policy decision-making body, the Supreme National Security Council, established the Defense Council to restructure Iran‘s defense strategy and restore deterrence through “hard power” following the Israel-Iran War.[9] The Defense Council warned on January 6 that “Iran does not consider itself limited to reacting after the action and considers objective signs of threat as part of the security equation,” which implies the possibility of Iranian preemptive action.[10] A preemptive action is taken to prevent an imminent attack or threat from an adversary, whereas a preventive action is taken to avert a future, non-imminent threat.[11] A political analyst close to the Iranian regime, Mostafa Najafi, stated on January 6 that the Defense Council issued the January 6 statement after receiving ”multiple signals regarding the urgency of potential threats.”[12] Najafi assessed that Iran is “highly unlikely” to launch a preemptive strike, however, and that the only way for Iran alter the current position that Iran, the US, and Israel are in is through the “restoration of deterrence.”[13] An unspecified Iranian official separately told Reuters on January 5 that these external pressures have narrowed the regime’s room to maneuver between protests and hardening US demands, leaving Iranian leaders with the perception that there are “few viable options and high risks on every path.”[14] Mahdi Mohammadi, an advisor to Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, similarly stated on X on January 5 that the “boundary” between the current state of the unknown and war, as well as “psychological operations and physical operations, and preemption and response, has become extremely faint” and even “intertwined.”[15]
The Iranian regime is likely trying to appease protesters by approving economic reforms, such as subsidies for basic goods. The Iranian Parliament approved the revised second edition of the 2026-2027 budget bill on January 5.[16] The bill mandates that the Iranian government will increase public sector salary raises from 20 percent up to 43 percent, keep the value added tax (VAT) rate at ten percent, and provide $8.8 billion (USD) in subsidized credits for the purchase of basic goods like eggs, oil, and red meat.[17] It is noteworthy that the first edition of the budget bill only increased public sector salaries by 20 percent, which some Iranian officials criticized as being insufficient to keep up with the current 42.2 percent inflation rate in Iran.[18] The updated subsidy will reportedly provide about 80 million Iranians approximately seven dollars a month per person for four months, which is still extremely low.[19] The average Iranian monthly wage is around $200.[20] It is unclear if the approved budget will appease protesters demanding economic reform, as some Iranian social media users mocked the subsidy amount as wholly insufficient.[21]
The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee published a statement on January 4 that rejects calls for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to disarm due to the ongoing presence of US and Turkish forces in Iraqi Kurdistan.[22] The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee is a coordinating body comprised of several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[23] Kataib Hezbollah, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya, and Asaib Ahl al Haq signed the January 4 statement.[24] The Karbala Brigades, which the United States has sanctioned as a Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada offshoot, also signed the statement.[25] This statement comes amid continued US pressure on the Iraqi federal government to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[26]
The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee’s statement is inconsistent with the expressed positions of Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada and Asaib Ahl al Haq on disarmament. Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada Spokesperson Kazem al Fartousi claimed on December 20 that weapons are already restricted to the Iraqi state and the militias and thus do not need to disarm.[27] Fartousi’s comments ignore the reality that many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, such as Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, possess weapons and are neither integrated into the Iraqi security forces nor answer to the Iraqi prime minister.[28] Asaib Ahl al Haq head Qais al Khazali appeared to support disarmament in a December 19 speech to his supporters.[29] Asaib Ahl al Haq then reiterated on January 6 its “clear and declared position since 2017” that weapons should exclusively belong to the Iraqi state.[30] Asaib Ahl al Haq’s military spokesperson denied on December 22, however, that the group intends to surrender its weapons.[31] The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee’s January 4 statement is consistent with other militias’ positions on disarmament. Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, for example, each issued statements on December 20 that rejected calls to disarm and restrict weapons to the state due to the ongoing presence of foreign forces in Iraq.[32] Harakat Ansar al Awfiya leader Haider al Ghrawi issued a contrasting statement on December 19 that called for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to disarm and restrict weapons to the Iraqi state.[33]
Saudi Arabia and Saudi-backed Yemeni actors continue to pressure the Emirati-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) and to reassert the internationally recognized Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG)’s control over southern Yemen. STC President and Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) Vice President Aidarous al Zubaidi likely traveled to Riyadh on January 6 under Saudi-led political pressure to participate in a Saudi-hosted southern Yemeni dialogue conference alongside other UAE-backed STC leaders.[34] The Riyadh-based, Saudi-supported Yemeni President and PLC President, Rashad al Alimi, summoned STC leaders to Riyadh on January 4 for “discussions” and to prepare for the Saudi-hosted conference during which southern Yemeni factions will discuss “solutions to the southern cause.”[35] Saudi Arabia almost certainly backs Alimi’s summons to reunify Yemen’s anti-Houthi factions and de-escalate the conflict between the ROYG and the STC. Saudi Arabia frequently uses the legitimacy of its Yemeni partners to provide a Yemeni veneer to Saudi political maneuvers.
Saudi Arabia and Saudi-backed Yemeni actors have likely, over the past day, increased political pressure on Zubaidi, who did not attend the January 4 meeting, to travel to Riyadh to meet with Alimi and Saudi officials.[36] The Southern Giant Brigades’ commander, STC Vice President and PLC Vice President Abu Zahraa Muharrami, travelled to Riyadh after Alimi‘s initial summons and met with Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman on January 3 and 4 to discuss Saudi-Yemeni coordination to stabilize Yemen.[37] The STC’s Southern Giant Brigades then assumed security control of Aden’s Maashiq Palace, where Zubaidi lives, on January 6.[38] The Southern Giant Brigades presumably assumed control over Maashiq Palace with Saudi approval, given Muharrami’s public willingness to cooperate with the Saudis and his meetings that preceded the deployment.[39] A Yemeni journalist stated that the Giant Brigades are expected to transfer control of the palace to Saudi-backed Yemeni forces upon their eventual arrival in Aden.[40] Al Jazeera’s Yemen affairs editor reported that Zubaidi ”was given a brief deadline” to depart from Aden before unspecified ”further measures” took place.[41]
The Saudi-backed National Shield Forces’ (NSF) consolidation of territorial gains from a recent counteroffensive and westward advance also contributes to the Saudi-led pressure effort to compel the Emirati-backed STC to cooperate with the ROYG. The NSF, supported by Saudi airstrikes, forced the STC to withdraw from Hadramawt and Mahra governorates between January 3 and 5.[42] Local authorities in Mahra governorate confirmed on January 6 that the NSF took full control over the governorate’s public facilities.[43] Several indicators suggest that the NSF will continue to advance westward and consolidate NSF control over STC-controlled territory. The NSF deployed to key positions within the STC-controlled Shabwa Governorate on January 6 after coordinating with local authorities in Ataq on January 5.[44] Shabwa Governorate’s UAE-backed governor has reiterated his support for the ROYG and Saudi-led Yemeni dialogue in recent days.[45] Several Yemeni sources suggested that the NSF was expected to arrive in Aden, which the STC controls, in the near future.[46]
US officials met with Saudi and Yemeni actors in Riyadh to discuss Yemeni stability on January 6 amid Saudi efforts to reassert the ROYG’s control over Yemen. Alimi and PLC Vice President Tariq Saleh separately met with US Ambassador to Yemen Stephen Fagin and US Senior Advisor for Arab and African Affairs Massad Boulos.[47] The United States supports a unified Yemen under the ROYG, which is recognized by the UN, and US and other Western officials have reiterated their long-standing support for the ROYG in recent statements and calls with Yemeni and Saudi officials.[48]
Syria
Israel and Syria reportedly agreed on January 6 to establish a US-supervised “fusion mechanism” for intelligence coordination, which indicates that both sides have likely made some progress toward an Israel–Syria security agreement amid reports of accelerated talks.[53] Israeli media reported on January 6 that the United States, Israel, and Syria agreed to establish a joint “fusion mechanism” based in Amman, Jordan, to coordinate intelligence sharing, border de-escalation, diplomacy, and commercial issues following US-mediated Israeli-Syrian talks in Paris on January 5.[54] An Israeli official separately told Axios on January 6 that Israel and Syria agreed to increase the pace of negotiations, hold more frequent meetings, and take unspecified confidence-building measures between the two countries following the negotiations in Paris.[55] Officials involved in negotiations did not provide a timeline to implement the “fusion mechanism,” however. A senior US official said on January 6 that the “fusion mechanism” will address the security situation in southern Syria, host further talks on demilitarization, and plan the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Syria.[56] The US official added that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the Syrian military will freeze all military activity in southern Syria until the parties finalize the details of the “fusion mechanism,” but did not provide further details.[57] The official also said the US delegation in Paris presented Israel and Syria with a proposal to establish a “demilitarized economic zone” along both sides of the Israel-Syria border.[58] Syrian negotiators seek a return to the 1974 disengagement agreement, which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared void after Assad’s fall in December 2024.[59] Israeli forces established semi-permanent positions inside Syria after Netanyahu declared the agreement void in December 2024.[60] Israeli negotiators previously sought a large, demilitarized zone across four Syrian provinces that extended to Damascus without Israeli demilitarization on the Israel-Syria border.[61] The US official said that unspecified regional partners have already committed to financing the demilitarized economic zone.[62]
Renewed fighting between Syrian government forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Kurdish-controlled neighborhoods of Aleppo City on January 6 is unlikely to derail ongoing Syrian government-SDF integration negotiations. Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) forces and SDF internal security forces engaged each other with heavy and medium weapons in the SDF-controlled Ashrafiyeh and Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhoods of Aleppo City on January 6.[63] The SDF and Syrian government mutually accused the other of initiating the fighting, which violated a previous December 2025 truce and a US-mediated October 2025 ceasefire agreement.[64] The January 6 MoD-SDF clashes in Aleppo City have killed at least seven civilians and an MoD fighter at the time of this writing.[65] The clashes in Aleppo City also follow separate fighting between the SDF and the MoD in Aleppo Province. Pro-government Syrian sources reported on January 5 that an SDF “suicide drone” strike wounded three MoD military police officers on the MoD-SDF frontlines in Deir Hafer, Aleppo Province.[66] The MoD launched heavy artillery strikes that targeted SDF positions near Deir Hafer, according to the same pro-government sources, in response to the SDF drone strike.[67] The SDF denied that its forces attacked the MoD military police officers.[68]
Neither the January 6 MoD-SDF clashes in Aleppo City nor the January 5 clashes in Deir Hafer, Aleppo Province, are likely to derail ongoing SDF integration negotiations, however. Previous MoD–SDF clashes in Ashrafiyeh and Sheikh Maqsoud in October and late December 2025 did not prevent ongoing SDF integration negotiations.[69] Intermittent MoD–SDF fighting in Deir Hafer, Aleppo Province since December 2024 has also not prevented negotiations either.[70]
