The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.
Toplines
US President Donald Trump’s messages have appeared to elicit a choreographed response by the Iranian regime that is directed both to regime factions and to the United States. The choreographed response was an attempt to portray unity between the “moderate” and “hardliner” factions in the regime by stating the same message affirming belief in the Islamic Revolution’s core values. Trump stated on Truth Social on April 23 that Iran is “having a hard time figuring out who their leader is.”[1] Trump highlighted infighting between the regime’s “moderate” and “hardliner” factions, adding that the United States will maintain the blockade on Iranian ships and ports until the regime is “able to make a deal.”[2]
The heads of Iran’s three branches of government–Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei, and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf–issued a series of statements aimed at defending themselves from accusations of “moderation” in the Islamic Revolutionary context. Pezeshkian, Ejei, and Ghalibaf published nearly identical messages on X on April 23 in which they emphasized their allegiance to the principles of the Islamic Revolution.[3] All three leaders rejected that the regime contains “hardline” and “moderate” factions and circulated the slogan “One God, one nation, one leader, and one path—the path of victory for Iran.” Ejei published the statement first, followed by Pezeshkian and Ghalibaf. Ejei, while a hardliner historically, allied with the pragmatic Iranian leaders during efforts to end the 12-Day War.[4] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, who, along with Ghalibaf, has been leading Iran’s negotiating delegation, posted a similar message on X in which he emphasized the regime’s unity.[5] Senior IRGC commanders such as Vahidi and SNSC Secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr did not circulate similar statements, but other IRGC-affiliated figures did several hours after Pezeshkian, Ejei, and Ghalibaf’s messages (see more below).
The publication of these messages and the context of the events surrounding them indicate that Pezeshkian, Ghalibaf, Ejei, and Araghchi likely sought to defend themselves from accusations of moderation, which Vahidi could use to challenge their commitment to the revolution. Araghchi, Ghalibaf, and Pezeshkian have adopted a more pragmatic approach toward the United States in negotiations, a stance that Vahidi and those close to him likely view as a diversion from the ideals of the Islamic Revolution. Vahidi attempted to insert Zolghadr into the first round of negotiations with the United States in Pakistan despite the protests of Araghchi and Ghalibaf.[6] Vahidi almost certainly did this to ensure that someone from his inner circle could keep tabs on whether Araghchi or Ghalibaf tried to negotiate outside of Vahidi’s red lines, which include maintaining support for the Axis of Resistance, recognizing Iran’s “right” to enrich uranium, and preserving Iran’s “control” over the Strait of Hormuz. US officials told Axios on April 20 that the US negotiating delegation thought it was “negotiating with the right people“ in Islamabad on April 11 and 12, but that the IRGC effectively told the Iranian negotiating delegation upon their return to Tehran that the negotiating team ”[does not] speak for” the IRGC.[7] Ghalibaf publicly defended the approach of negotiating with the United States in a speech on April 18 and criticized hardline officials–including SNSC member Saeed Jalili and hardline parliamentarian Amirhossein Sabeti–for their opposition to negotiations during a meeting with advisers.[8] ISW-CTP previously assessed that Ghalibaf’s criticism was likely implicitly aimed at Vahidi because Vahidi also opposes negotiating with the United States.[9]
Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei acknowledged Ghalibaf, Pezeshkian, Ejei, and Aragchi’s obeisance several hours later in a choreographed manner that likely seeks to demonstrate unity and signal an end to the internal competition between pragmatic and hardliner officials. Mojtaba suggested that the statements represented a spontaneous unification of the regime’s divided factions and portrayed this unification as a direct response to Trump’s statement. ISW-CTP has rendered Mojtaba’s statement in English below:
“Due to the extraordinary unity forged among our compatriots, a fracture has appeared within the enemy. With active gratitude for this blessing, our cohesion will become stronger and more ironclad, and the enemies will be further humiliated and disgraced. The enemy media operations, by targeting the minds and souls of the people, aim to undermine national unity and security; May this evil intention not be realized due to our negligence.”[10]
IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency portrayed the messages solely as a response to recent comments from Trump.[11] It is not clear who is writing Mojtaba’s online messages, given that he is in poor physical condition (see below).
A number of IRGC and IRGC-affiliated regime figures posted similar statements hours after the “moderates’” statements to express agreement with and support for Mojtaba’s position. These messages present an apparent unified front against the United States. But they also allow the IRGC to deflect attempts by pragmatists to blame the IRGC or hardliners if war resumes by spreading the blame across the entirety of the ”unified” government. Figures like IRGC Aerospace Commander Brigadier General Majid Mousavi, former SNSC Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian, IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani, and Artesh Commander Major General Amir Hatami posted messages affirming the “One God, one nation, one leader, and one path” message and unity against the United States.[12]
Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei is likely unable to seriously impact Iranian decision-making due to injuries sustained during the war, however. The New York Times reported on April 23 that Mojtaba is under frequent medical attention and heavily reliant on the advice and guidance of senior IRGC commanders led by Vahidi, citing a number of former IRGC and current regime officials.[13] One adviser to former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stated that Mojtaba is running the country like it is a company board, with the senior IRGC commanders as the members of the board. The report noted that regime officials have difficulties communicating with Mojtaba, including because they needto send messages secretly and via multiple runners. The article also noted that Mojtaba has been heavily influenced by IRGC commanders due to his close historical ties with them from the Iran-Iraq War. Supreme Leader Military Affairs Adviser Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi has reportedly served as Mojtaba’s top military adviser, as he did with Mojtaba’s father, Ali Khamenei. The New York Times report is consistent with ISW-CTP’s assessment at the time of Mojtaba’s assumption of power that he would likely be influenced by the more hardline elements of the Iranian regime due to his close ties to them.[14]
Vahidi continues to support Iranian sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz and efforts to retain the nuclear program, because he views negotiations with the United States as having no present value, according to IRGC sources and anti-Iranian regime media.[15] An IRGC‑affiliated outlet argued on April 22 that negotiations over the Strait of Hormuz are “unnecessary” because such negotiations would signal doubt over Iran’s sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz.[16] The same outlet stated that negotiations under these conditions would grant the United States a low‑cost victory and violate declared red lines, particularly on Iran’s nuclear file and “regional cooperation,“ which is likely a euphemism for the Axis of Resistance.[17] Senior Iranian parliamentarians broadly echoed this hardline posture on April 22 and 23 by portraying negotiations as damaging to deterrence and acceptable only under tightly constrained, Iranian‑defined terms.[18] Anti-regime media reported on April 23 that Mojtaba’s office, which Vahidi appears to run, opposed the discussion of the nuclear issue.[19] Araghchi reportedly contended that, under the Supreme Leader’s orders, participation in negotiations offers little benefit and effectively amounts to a “death sentence” for the talks.[20] Vahidi and several other generals reportedly did not see the point in negotiating with the United States because the US naval blockade of Iran demonstrated that US President Donald Trump was not interested in negotiations and instead sought to pressure Iran to surrender, according to officials and two members of the IRGC briefed on the meeting who spoke to the New York Times on April 23.[21] Pakistani officials told Saudi media on April 23 that Iran-Pakistan contact continues, but confirmed that discussions are stalled due to Iranian opposition to the US naval blockade.[22] The officials noted that Iran has not formally responded to the possibility of future talks.[23] These reports of Vahidi’s unwillingness to negotiate are consistent with ISW-CTP’s April 22 assessment that Vahidi is deliberately accepting the risk of potential US military response to assert Iranian ”control” over the Strait of Hormuz.[24]
Vahidi is part of the first generation of revolutionaries, and he prioritizes ideological purity and hard power over the economy and well-being of Iranian citizens. The regime figures who appear more pragmatic and are concerned with the economy — Pezeshkian and Ghalibaf — also appear to have accepted Vahidi’s positions in pursuit of unifying the Iranian political class.[25] Pezeshkian and Araghchi disagreed with Vahidi and other IRGC officials’ view that talks are pointless, according to officials and two members of the Guards briefed on the meeting who spoke to the New York Times on April 23.[26] Pezeshkian also warned that financial gains from negotiations — likely in reference to the lifting of the naval blockade, sanctions relief, and the unfreezing of Iranian assets abroad — are needed to pay for the estimated $300 billion in losses from war with the United States and Israel.[27] Vahidi and the IRGC dismissed Pezeshkian’s concerns over the economy, as they have done since the start of the war, according to anti-regime media.[28] Vahidi almost certainly gives precedence to ideological orthodoxy and hard power over ideological flexibility that would present the sort of agreement that would dampen economic challenges. Hard power, in this logic, is essential for the Iranian regime’s control over Iran from both internal and external threats. Economic distress remains one of the regime’s most significant internal vulnerabilities, as demonstrated by the December 2025–January 2026 protests.[29] Ideologically orthodox revolutionaries who prioritize hard power believe that such vulnerabilities can be guarded against through force.
Maritime Developments
The US Navy has continued to demonstrate its ability to enforce its blockade on Iranian ports. US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced on April 23 that it has directed 33 Iranian or Iranian-linked vessels to turn around or return to port since the start of the blockade on April 13.[30] US forces have also boarded or intercepted at least four other vessels east of the blockade line in the Indian Ocean in recent days. The four ships that the US Navy intercepted have been shipping Iranian oil in violation of the blockade. Some sources indicate that the US Navy also intercepted a fifth vessel. The following window into US Navy blockade enforcement suggests that blockade runners have consistent characteristics: all five are under US sanctions and are transporting Iranian oil.
- US forces intercepted and boarded the US-sanctioned Majestic X (IMO: 9198417) oil tanker on April 23, which was transporting Iranian oil, in the Bay of Bengal.[31] The Majestic X previously operated as the Phonix and has previously helped Iran export oil while falsely operating under a Guyanese flag.[32]
- US forces intercepted the OFAC-sanctioned Deep Sea (IMO: 9357353) oil tanker, according to an April 23 Reuters report.[33] The Deep Sea was partially loaded with Iranian crude oil.[34] The vessel has had its automatic identification system (AIS) transponder off since March 22, according to commercially available shipping data.[35]
- US forces intercepted the OFAC-sanctioned Sevin (IMO: 9357353) oil tanker, according to the same Reuters report.[36] The Sevin was carrying roughly 650,000 barrels of Iranian oil when it was intercepted.[37] The vessel has had its AIS transponder off since March 15, according to commercially available shipping data.[38]
- US forces intercepted the Iranian-flagged, OFAC-sanctioned Dorena (IMO: 9569669), which is under US Navy destroyer escort in the Indian Ocean as of April 22, after the vessel attempted to run the blockade.[39] The Dorena is fully loaded with 2 million barrels of oil.[40]
- Reuters reported that US forces “may” have also intercepted the Iranian-flagged, OFAC-sanctioned Derya (IMO: 9569700) tanker, according to shipping sources speaking to Reuters.[41] It was also transporting oil.[42] This vessel is off the coast of India as of April 18, though it previously left the Gulf on March 9.[43]
Iran is leveraging coercive maritime actions, transit controls, and escalation threats to shape conditions in and around the Strait of Hormuz and assert sovereignty over the waterway. IRGC-affiliated Fars News reinforced the Iranian regime line that Iran has sovereignty over the Strait in an April 22 op-ed by arguing that negotiations over the Strait are unnecessary because Iranian control is an established “geographical and legal reality.”[44] Fars also warned that discussing it would undermine the current status and signal doubt in Iran’s sovereignty.[45] Iranian officials also stated that Iran has received the first revenue from transit fees imposed on vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz, which authorities deposited into the Central Bank of Iran.[46] The IRGC published footage on April 22 showing IRGC fast attack craft intercepting and seizing the MSC Francesca and Epaminondas in the Strait of Hormuz.[47] White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated on April 22 that US President Donald Trump does not view these seizures as a violation of the ceasefire framework because the vessels were not US or Israeli vessels.[48]
Iran’s measures coincided with the regime’s efforts to reinforce its military capability to enforce control over the maritime activity in the Strait. Iranian Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei stated that the IRGC “swarm fleet,” composed of fast boats and unmanned surface vessels, waits in maritime caves on Farur Island for US naval vessels to conduct saturation-style attacks.[49] Fars additionally argued on April 23 that Iran could respond to a continued or intensified maritime blockade by fully closing the Strait of Hormuz through extensive minelaying, closing the Bab al Mandeb Strait, and conducting broader retaliatory operations.[50] Arab officials told The Wall Street Journal on April 13 that Iran pressured the Houthis to “close” the Bab al Mandeb Strait, which supports the assessment that Iran is framing maritime pressure as a trigger for escalation across multiple chokepoints.[51] ISW-CTP previously assessed that the Houthis are unlikely to expand attacks in ways that would jeopardize their domestic position, however.[52]
Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response
Hezbollah has continued to conduct attacks targeting Israeli forces in southern Lebanon for the third consecutive day despite the ceasefire in Lebanon.[59] Hezbollah claimed that it conducted two attacks targeting IDF personnel in Taybeh, Marjaayoun District, southeastern Lebanon, since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff on April 22.[60] An Israeli military correspondent reported that Hezbollah fired an anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) targeting Israeli forces in southern Lebanon.[61] This may correspond to Hezbollah’s claim that it fired “appropriate weapons” at IDF personnel in Taybeh on the evening of April 22.[62] Hezbollah also claimed that it launched a first-person view (FPV) drone targeting IDF personnel in Taybeh on April 23.[63] The IDF did not report any casualties from Hezbollah attacks since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff.
IDF has continued to conduct air and ground operations in southern Lebanon in accordance with the temporary ceasefire agreement. The IDF reported that it has conducted around 50 airstrikes that killed over 25 Hezbollah operatives since the start of the temporary ceasefire on April 16.[64] The IDF also said that it has destroyed hundreds of Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon since the beginning of the ceasefire.[65] IDF reported that it conducted an airstrike that killed a Hezbollah fighter at a rocket launch site near Sejoud, Jezzine District, southeastern Lebanon, on April 22.[66] IDF units have continued to kill Hezbollah fighters and destroy Hezbollah infrastructure, including weapons caches and tunnels, in southern Lebanon.[67] The IDF 300th Infantry Territorial Brigade (146th Reserve Division) soldiers also arrested a Hezbollah Radwan Force member during an operation to seize Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Lebanon on April 23, for example.[68]
US President Donald Trump announced that Israel and Lebanon have agreed to extend the temporary ceasefire for an additional 21 days.[69] Trump said that US Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee, US Ambassador to Lebanon Michel Issa, and himself met with Israeli Ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter and Lebanese Ambassador to the US Nada Hamadeh at the White House for the second round of direct ambassador-level talks between Israel and Lebanon on April 23.[70] Trump stated that the United States will work with the Lebanese government to “protect itself” from Hezbollah.[71]
Israeli and Lebanese officials continue to disagree on long-standing issues, including the presence of an Israeli buffer zone in southern Lebanon, however.[72] Israeli officials have repeatedly stated that the IDF will remain in Lebanon to protect northern Israeli communities from Hezbollah infiltration efforts and anti-tank guided missile fire.[73] Lebanese PM Nawaf Salam told the Washington Post on April 23 that any agreement with Israel must include a full IDF withdrawal and a removal of the Israeli “buffer zone” in southern Lebanon.[74] Salam said that the Lebanese government is urging the US to pressure Israel to extend the 10-day ceasefire and to scale back some of its demands.[75] A Lebanese official told Reuters that the Lebanese government wants a ceasefire extension as a prerequisite for talks before talks expand beyond the ambassador level.[76] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun reiterated on April 23 that Lebanon’s primary objectives for the meeting are extending the April 16 ceasefire and halting Israeli demolitions in southern Lebanon.[77]
Israeli officials have signaled the IDF’s readiness to resume operations in Lebanon after the conclusion of the temporary ceasefire. Israeli military officials told Israeli media on April 22 that the IDF is preparing for the possibility that the temporary ceasefire in Lebanon could “collapse at any moment.”[78] The officials said that Hezbollah is reorganizing its forces and attempting to change “the rules of the game” during the temporary ceasefire.[79] IDF Chief of Staff Major General Eyal Zamir said on April 22 that the IDF remains on high alert and is “prepared to return immediately and forcefully to combat in all sectors.”[80] Lebanese media reported on April 21 that Lebanese President Joseph Aoun received a warning that if Hezbollah obstructs negotiations between Israel and the Lebanese government, then Israel will launch “a broad and crushing war on Lebanon.”[81]
