There may inevitably come a point in Super Bowl 60 on Sunday when the New England Patriots will face a fourth-and-short in the red zone and coach Mike Vrabel will grind his molars — or open a spreadsheet — debating what to do.
If it happens to the Seattle Seahawks, we probably already know the outcome. Seahawks coach Mike Macdonald takes the points about as often as any coach in the league.
Those three words — take the points — have become some of the most divisive in football today. Modern play calling insists on going for it on fourth downs, particularly in the opponent’s territory, because converting on fourth down helps more than failing to convert on fourth down hurts. Or so the thinking goes.
Every week on college and pro football fields across America, coaches have been going for it on fourth downs more frequently than ever before. At the same time, a civil war breaks out on social media over whether it was the right decision.
The Denver Broncos lost the AFC Championship Game in part because Sean Payton elected to go for it on fourth-and-1 from the Patriots’ 14-yard line in the second quarter and failed to convert. The Indiana Hoosiers are national champions in part because Curt Cignetti called for a quarterback draw on fourth-and-4 from Miami’s 12-yard line and quarterback Fernando Mendoza scored on an iconic touchdown dive.
Indiana quarterback Fernando Mendoza dives for a fourth-quarter touchdown against Miami in the College Football Playoff national championship. The Hoosiers’ decision to go for it on fourth-and-4 was instrumental in their winning the title. (Carmen Mandato / Getty Images)
Two similar calls, two similar spots on the field. Two drastically different outcomes.
The Hoosiers won a title. The Broncos failed to score the rest of the game and lost by, yep, a field goal.
Nevertheless, the analytics side is winning the raging debate over whether to go for it or take the points — NFL teams opted to go for it on nearly 34 percent of fourth-down opportunities in opponent territory in 2025, according to TruMedia data. That’s the highest rate of any season this century. I’ve long been a proponent of following the math and going for it, although coaches like Mike Martz make a compelling case to kick. Martz is basically disgusted by what football has become.
“There’s a stupidity to this where numbers take over, and it’s insane,” Martz told me. “It shouldn’t be that way. It’s always about people. It always will be about people.”
Martz was ahead of his generation as one of the smartest, most creative offensive minds in the game. He developed the explosive “Greatest Show on Turf” offense, won a Super Bowl as the St. Louis Rams’ offensive coordinator and guided the Rams to another Super Bowl as head coach. Nobody loved to throw and throttle up more than Martz, but he believes the mindset of always going for it on fourth down has choked the actual strategy of football out of the game.
“Analytics has gotten way too big of a bite with what’s happening in football today, and it’s unjustified,” he said. “Because whether you go for it or not, those numbers are based on other teams with different people, different plays, different play calling against different defenses. The only commonality between the two is the situation: fourth-and-1.”
The math behind going for it is relatively straightforward. The win probability gained from converting fourth downs is greater than what a team risks losing by turning the ball over on downs, particularly deep in the opponent’s territory.
The NFL’s changes to its kickoff rules before the 2024 season drastically shifted the data. Now, teams on average begin drives from the 30-yard line following kickoffs, according to TruMedia.
The risk of going for it in the red zone and failing is better than kicking a field goal (and giving the opponent the ball at the 30) because play calling near a team’s own goal line is typically more conservative. Hold a team to a three-and-out, get the ball back around midfield following a punt and try again.
NFL Offensive Rates by Drive Start, Last 2 Seasons
After kickoff
After opponent red zone turnover on downs
Average drive start
Own 30
Own 9
Points per drive
2.1
1.1
Touchdown drive percentage
23 percent
12 percent
Three-and-out percentage
31 percent
42 percent
Dropback percentage
62 percent
48 percent
Statistics by TruMedia
Martz sees two problems with that: You still have to play defense to get a stop and, more importantly, it’s devastating to an offense to come away after a long drive with nothing.
“The thing you don’t want to do is come off that field after a 70-yard drive, even if it’s on the 10-yard line, and not get points,” Martz said. “There’s a psychology to it at some point. You just take the points as you can get them.”
Taking the points isn’t a guarantee. Kickers still have to make their kicks, which they did 97 percent of the time on attempts within 35 yards, according to TruMedia. Teams are converting fourth downs about 57 percent of the time. It’s easy to see why fans get so upset when teams turn down a 97 percent chance for a 57 percent chance, yet the numbers indicate teams have gotten better at going for it on fourth down in the red zone over the years — even if it didn’t feel that way when Jarrett Stidham threw incomplete in the AFC Championship Game and the Broncos were eventually eliminated from the playoffs.
As recently as 2020, teams went for it on fourth down 159 times in the red zone and converted 51 percent of them. The average line to gain was 2.4 yards away, according to TruMedia.
Mike Martz, architect of the St. Louis Rams’ “Greatest Show on Turf,” is no fan of analytics. (Jeff Haynes / Getty Images)
This season, the line to gain was 2.7 yards away. Still fairly similar to five years ago. Yet teams went for it 237 times and converted on 57 percent of the attempts. The 57 percent conversion rate has held relatively steady over the last three years, but this is easily the most often teams have gone for it on fourth down in the red zone since TruMedia began tracking such data in 2000.
That was the season after the Rams won the Super Bowl with Martz as offensive coordinator. Back then, teams went for it on fourth down in the red zone just 92 times.
The Patriots were better than everyone when they chose to do it this year, converting 83 percent of the time in Vrabel’s first year.
The Seahawks, conversely, went for it on red zone fourth downs less than any other team in football this year: only twice. Their 19 red zone field goals tied for the league lead.
Martz believes there are specific times when going for it makes sense, but usually that doesn’t occur until the fourth quarter or if a coach knows the opponent’s tendencies and knows how they’ll line up in certain situations.
He still remembers a play from when he was the offensive coordinator for the Chicago Bears in the 2011 playoffs against the Seahawks. He would have been comfortable going for it on fourth-and-short at any point in the game, but the Bears used it on third-and-1 from Seattle’s 39 in the fourth quarter. Jay Cutler ran play-action, the Seahawks bit with nine near the line of scrimmage, and Cutler heaved it deep to tight end Kellen Davis for the final touchdown of a 35-10 Bears victory.
“I couldn’t wait to call that play,” Martz said.
Ultimately, Martz believes the analytics and this new way of thinking are here to stay because owners have invested heavily in analytics departments.
“There’s somebody, the head coach or whoever, who is dumb enough to think that this is really the key, and it takes away from the game. It takes away from the human element of the game,” Martz said. “You might as well just plug your whole game plan into a computer and just call it by computer and tell all the coaches to go home. It’s sickening to me. When somebody says ‘analytics’ on TV, I just run to the bathroom to vomit.
“We’re relying on some numbers? Really? If you aren’t smart enough and prepared enough to make an educated decision on what to do, then you shouldn’t be there.”
