During the run-up to U.S. President Donald Trump’s visit to Beijing, he remained ambiguous about his views on Taiwan. When asked in interviews, he regularly lamented that Taiwan “stole” America’s semiconductor industry while adding a note of reassurance that there would not be a war in the Taiwan Strait under his watch. He would recount that he and Chinese President Xi Jinping shared an understanding about avoiding conflict over Taiwan. Even as many American lawmakers and commentators openly warned ahead of the trip about the risk of Trump treating Taiwan as a bargaining chip in his talks with Xi, members of the Trump administration dismissed such concerns. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and others assured that there would be no change to America’s approach to one of the most sensitive war and peace issues in America’s foreign policy portfolio.
In the hours following Trump’s conversations with Xi Jinping in Beijing this week, Trump offered a deeper window into his thinking. Trump made clear he was “not looking to have somebody [Taiwan] go independent,” and that Taiwan needs to “cool down a bit,” along with China. He questioned whether it made sense for American forces to “travel 9,500 miles to fight a war.” And Trump said he considered a pending $14 billion American arms sales package to Taiwan as leverage in his dealings with Xi.
The net effect of his comments was to suggest that his views on Taiwan independence were closer to Beijing’s preferences, that Taiwan had a greater responsibility to avoid provoking conflict, and that America’s security support for Taiwan was negotiable with China. Trump’s comments placed him apart from the views of most American experts and officials, including those within his own administration, who judge that China’s steadily increasing pressure on Taiwan has been the principal source of rising tensions, not actions by Taiwan or the United States. In so doing, Trump did not reduce the risk of conflict. He raised it. Trump’s visible sympathy for Xi’s framing on Taiwan will embolden Beijing to increase pressure on Taipei. This will elevate – not lower – the risk of confrontation.
Trump did not need to parrot Xi’s characterization of the situation in the Taiwan Strait. For over four decades, America’s longstanding policy on Taiwan and cross-Strait issues has helped keep a lid on one of the world’s most consequential potential flashpoints. America’s steady approach also has enabled Washington to pull off the seemingly impossible – forging dense ties with Beijing and simultaneously deep connections with Taipei. America’s close unofficial relationship with Taiwan has proven critical for America’s ability to advance its ambitions in artificial intelligence and other high-tech sectors, given Taiwan’s near global monopoly in the production of high-end semiconductors. Washington has done all this despite Beijing’s unwavering determination to assert control over Taiwan and China’s growing military and economic means to do so.
Arguably, the most essential ingredient in Washington’s policy framework for achieving these ends has not been any specific military capability or clever diplomatic strategy. It has been America’s consistent, predictable, and resolute focus on upholding peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, backed by a credible military deterrent.
By calling into question whether America will sustain its longstanding approach to cross-Strait issues, Trump is inviting an onslaught of pressure from Beijing on both Washington and Taipei. Trump’s public openness to negotiating with Beijing over America’s posture on Taiwan will serve as the diplomatic equivalent of a matador waving a red flag in front of a bull. It will cause Beijing to intensify its efforts to test the boundaries of what it can gain in terms of loosening America’s commitment to Taiwan’s security.
Trump’s public openness to negotiating with Beijing over America’s posture on Taiwan will serve as the diplomatic equivalent of a matador waving a red flag in front of a bull.
Beijing’s aim is to cause America to withdraw from involvement in cross-Strait relations. China’s leaders assume that when Beijing gets Washington out of the way and reaches a point of dealing one-on-one with Taipei, then it will be able to impose its will on Taiwan’s 23 million people to accept unification on its terms.
In the meantime, Beijing will seize on Trump’s recent comments to signal to Taiwan’s 23 million people that Trump cares more about his relationship with Xi than he does about them. China’s propaganda machine will kick into overdrive to build a narrative that the people of Taiwan are mere pawns in a great power game. The further Trump opens the aperture for exploring trade space with Beijing over Taiwan, the more China’s appetite will grow with the eating. For Beijing, there is no stopping until Taiwan is firmly under PRC control.
Such a trend of intensifying PRC assertiveness toward Taiwan runs counter to America’s abiding interest in preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Rather than sating Beijing’s appetite by showing sympathy toward China’s opposition to Taiwan independence, Trump has emboldened Beijing to press for more.
Chinese officials have long argued that American arms sales to Taiwan are not up for negotiation. They assert that the United States and China already reached an understanding, as codified in the third U.S.-China joint communique of 1982, that the United States would not sell arms to Taiwan indefinitely, and it would reduce arms sales to Taiwan over time. So, from Beijing’s perspective, it will not negotiate to buy the same horse twice.
In other words, Trump appears to be dangling a concession Beijing believes it previously has secured. Trump is giving up credibility without extracting benefits from Beijing. This is not just a policy shift. It is a shift from deterrence to dealmaking in a domain where there is no deal to be made, beyond offering unilateral concessions that undermine deterrence. If Trump acts on his musings about treating Taiwan arms sales as a source of leverage, he would crater the confidence of America’s security commitments, not just in Taiwan but among America’s allies globally.
This is not just a policy shift. It is a shift from deterrence to dealmaking in a domain where there is no deal to be made, beyond offering unilateral concessions that undermine deterrence.
Any American attempt to use arms sales to Taiwan as leverage with Beijing also would diminish America’s influence in Taiwan. If Taiwan’s leaders conclude that the United States prioritizes its relationship with Beijing and is willing to sacrifice Taiwan in service of goals with China, then they naturally will have less incentive to take heed of American interests and concerns. If Trump truly believes that Taiwan is the principal risk point for sparking a confrontation or conflict in the Taiwan Strait, as his recent comments imply, then he should be motivated to strengthen American influence in Taipei rather than deplete it.
Maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait does not require Trump to memorize and regularly recite the catechism of America’s “one-China” policy. It does, however, require Trump to stand resolutely against actions by either side of the Taiwan Strait to unilaterally alter the status quo. It is fine for Trump to urge Taiwan to avoid stirring trouble in the Taiwan Strait so long as he also holds firm against PRC coercion or violence in pursuit of its goals.
America should welcome and encourage direct dialogue between leaders in Taipei and Beijing to resolve cross-Strait differences. Doing so makes clear that America’s interests are not in conflict with China’s ambitions. Encouraging cross-Strait dialogue helps channel China’s energy toward appealing to the interests of Taiwan’s 23 million people. Taiwan’s people – not Trump – will be the center of gravity in determining Taiwan’s future relationship with the PRC. If Beijing wants to integrate and ultimately unify Taiwan with the mainland, it needs to articulate a vision for the future that can attract support from Taiwan people and their elected leaders.
Ultimately, Trump’s instinct to avoid war is sound, but his approach to doing so by placating Xi’s preferences is dangerous. In a best-case scenario, Trump’s words will remain just that – the expressions of a jet-lagged leader on his way home from a grueling visit to Beijing. For Trump, the path to reducing risks of conflict is not to bargain away Taiwan. It is to remain firmly focused on upholding peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and keeping a path open for leaders on both sides of the Strait eventually to resolve their differences. This will require reinforcing deterrence, resisting unilateral moves that threaten peace and stability by either side of the Strait, and preserving influence in both Beijing and Taipei.
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