The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.
Toplines
Hezbollah and Iranian leaders continue to reject any ceasefire framework in Lebanon that does not meet their maximalist demand for total Israeli capitulation in Lebanon. Hezbollah and Iran’s insistence on this demand is part of an effort to defer negotiations about key points of disagreement between Iran and the United States, particularly Iranian efforts to control the Strait of Hormuz, and strengthen Iran’s negotiating position vis-à-vis the United States. The United States, Israel, and Lebanon issued a joint statement on June 3 agreeing to implement a ceasefire contingent upon Hezbollah’s agreement to halt all attacks and evacuate its fighters south of the Litani River.[1] The joint statement indicates that Israel, Lebanon, and the United States seek to develop a framework to achieve their respective long-term objectives in Lebanon.[2] The statement announced that Israel and Lebanon would coordinate to establish “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) would deploy to these zones “to the exclusion of all non-state actors.”[3] The Lebanese government confirmed that the LAF has begun deploying to southern Lebanese territory that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) seized during ground operations against Hezbollah.[4] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun called the joint statement the “last opportunity” to obtain “a final and comprehensive ceasefire” in Lebanon on June 4.[5] Israeli Ambassador to the United States Yechiel Leiter separately said on June 4 that a ceasefire in Lebanon would be contingent upon Hezbollah’s “complete dismantling.”[6] Hezbollah rejected the joint statement’s condition that the group cease attacks and withdraw to north of the Litani River.[7] Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem said on June 4 that Hezbollah’s accession to the joint statement would constitute surrender and instead reiterated the group’s long-standing demands for a “comprehensive ceasefire” that would require Israel to cease all military operations and withdraw from Lebanon.[8] Qassem indicated that Hezbollah will continue its attacks until Israel accedes to the group’s demands.[9] These demands constitute total Israeli capitulation in Lebanon because agreeing to them would force Israel to abandon its core political objective for operations in Lebanon, which is to dismantle Hezbollah as a militant group.[10]
Hezbollah and Iranian leaders are unified in viewing Israeli capitulation in Lebanon as inextricable from Iranian negotiations with the United States. Qassem acknowledged Iran’s role in pushing for a complete ceasefire in Lebanon and noted that Iran’s push for a complete ceasefire is an “integral part” of Iran’s own efforts against the United States.[11] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani also called for a full ceasefire in Lebanon and complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon on June 4.[12] The IRGC similarly stated on June 4 that a ceasefire on “all fronts” was Iran’s “initial condition” for the US-Iran ceasefire, which went into effect in early April.[13] Senior Iranian officials, including former IRGC Commander and current IRGC Baghiyatollah Sociocultural Headquarters Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari, previously described a ceasefire in Lebanon as a precondition for negotiations with the United States.[14] Iranian officials have re-emphasized this issue in recent days amid the deadlock in US-Iran negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program and the status of the Strait of Hormuz, however.[15]
Iranian officials have continued to emphasize the Lebanon issue in order to try to deflect focus away from key points of disagreement in the US-Iran negotiations, particularly the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear program, which the regime seeks to avoid making concessions on. The United States and Iran do not currently appear to be discussing Iran’s nuclear program, given that Iran suspended negotiations until a complete ceasefire in Lebanon is reached.[16] ISW-CTP previously noted that a protracted discussion about Lebanon deflects from negotiations over Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile and ability to enrich uranium. Iranian officials and media have also not commented on US demands regarding Iran’s nuclear program in recent days. Iranian officials and media continue to insist that Iran will not cede control of the Strait of Hormuz, however. A newspaper published on the Supreme Leader’s website, Voice of Iran, published an op-ed on June 2 claiming that Iran has the “winning cards” in negotiations over the strait and that the status of the strait will not return to pre-war conditions.[17] This comment reflects how the Iranian regime does not solely seek to survive this war and return to the pre-war status quo; the regime has positive objectives that it seeks to achieve, including securing Iranian sovereignty over the strait.[18]
Iran has continued to try to justify its control over the Strait of Hormuz by attempting to give its illegal actions in the strait a veneer of legality. Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi claimed that Iran is complying with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) because Iran is offering “services” and “protection” to vessels in Iranian waters in an interview with Iranian media on June 4.[19] The “protection” that Iran is “offering” vessels is protection from Iranian attacks, which means that Iran has effectively established a protection racket in the strait. Iran has repeatedly used force, including attacks on commercial vessels and naval mines, to make vessels sail through Iranian territorial waters. Iranian officials then claim that Iran has the right to extract a fee from these vessels.[20]
Iran also continues to demand other preconditions for negotiations, such as immediate economic relief upon the signing of any US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MOU). ISW-CTP previously assessed that, even if Iran’s maximalist demands in Lebanon are met, Iran could condition further negotiations with the United States on additional US concessions.[21] Gharibabadi told Iranian media on June 4 that Iran still seeks the immediate release of at least half of its frozen assets upon the signing of an MoU and the second half in the subsequent negotiating period in his interview with Iranian media on June 4.[22]
Iran additionally continues to seek to erode US regional influence by trying to strain relations between the United States and the Gulf countries. Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei claimed on June 4 that the war has caused a “tangible divergence of countries from” the United States, possibly in reference to the Gulf states.[23] Mojtaba previously claimed in late April that US bases in the region cannot defend the United States’ Gulf partners, also likely as part of an effort to sow divisions between the United States and its Gulf partners and push Gulf countries to expel US forces from their territory.[24] Iran has continued to launch missile and drone attacks targeting the Gulf states following the ceasefire in April, most recently Kuwait and Bahrain on June 2.[25]
The Iraqi federal government has begun to try to restrict arms to the state through the disarmament and integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi security establishment, including the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[26] Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr’s “deputy for jihad affairs” formally handed over the flag of Sadr’s militia, Saraya al Salam, to representatives of the federal government’s committee in charge of restricting arms to the state on June 4.[27] Sadr announced on May 27 the dissolution of Saraya al Salam and the “full integration” of the militia’s members into the Iraqi state.[28] The Iraqi Joint Operations Command deputy commander, who heads the federal government’s disarmament committee, said that the “mechanism” linking Saraya al Salam to the PMF will be abolished and that the militia will be “directly linked” to the prime minister, presumably after it is integrated into the PMF.[29] Saraya al Salam controls the 313th, 314th, and 315th PMF brigades.[30] The federal government committee also includes representatives from the defense and interior ministries and the PMF and is responsible for developing “mechanisms, technical contexts, and arrangements related to weapons and restructuring, leading to [the] full integration” of militia members into the Iraqi security establishment.[31] Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi’s spokesperson said on June 3 that the government’s efforts to restrict arms to the state apply to all armed groups operating outside of the PMF.[32] A Shia Coordination Framework member also said on June 3 that the federal government has formed joint committees with militias to develop inventories of militia weapons and supervise the handover of operations to the PMF.[33] Zaydi held separate meetings with delegations from Asaib Ahl al Haq and Kataib al Imam Ali on June 3 to discuss disarmament.[34] Both militias announced their readiness to restrict arms to the state on June 2.[35]
Zaydi is also reportedly pursuing a plan, approved by unidentified framework leaders, in which disarmed militia members would integrate into other Iraqi security institutions, such as the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS).[36] Informed sources told Iraqi media on June 4 that Zaydi presented US officials with a proposal to gradually disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in exchange for US investment in Iraq.[37] Zaydi’s plan reportedly includes granting jobs in formal security institutions, including CTS, to 35,000 militia members who disarm.[38] Saraya al Salam members would fill 15,000 of these positions, according to the informed sources.[39] Unidentified framework leaders reportedly approved this plan and agreed that officials from the defense and interior ministries would be “involved” in overseeing the federal government’s disarmament efforts.[40] The framework is a loose coalition of Iraqi Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs, and it is unclear which specific elements of the framework supported this plan. Asaib Ahl al Haq head Qais al Khazali and Kataib al Imam Ali head Shibl al Zaidi, who are both framework members, almost certainly supported the plan, however. The informed sources added to Iraqi media that the political wings of multiple Iraqi militias have threatened to leave the framework and boycott the Iraqi political process if the framework proceeds with US pressure to disarm the militias and dissolve or integrate the PMF.[41]
Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Hezbollah–whose political wing is part of the framework, continue to reject disarmament. A Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba official said on June 3 that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq refuses to disarm.[42] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, includes Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Kataib Hezbollah, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, and Ansar Allah al Awfiya.[43] These militias have, both historically and during the war, been the most kinetically active and are more subordinate to Iran than other Iraqi militias.[44] Kataib Hezbollah said on June 4 that it would not disarm until foreign troops in Iraq, almost certainly in reference to US and Turkish forces, withdraw and foreign interference in Yemen ends.[45] Kataib Hezbollah added that it would only surrender its weapons to the “Imam Mahdi.”[46] The Imam Mahdi is the twelfth and final Imam in Shia Islam, who, according to Twelver Shia, is hiding and will reveal himself in the future.[47] Kataib Hezbollah also said that militias that have agreed to disarm have already severed their ties to Iran, stopped obeying Iran’s orders, and stopped conducting attacks against the “adversary,” in reference to Asaib Ahl al Haq and Kataib al Imam Ali.[48] Iraq analysts have long noted that Asaib Ahl al Haq’s leadership, particularly its head Qais al Khazali, has focused more on politics than kinetic activity in recent years, including during the October 7 War.[49] Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba criticized Asaib Ahl al Haq in November 2023 for failing to conduct attacks against US forces in Iraq and Syria.[50] The US Treasury Department noted in April 2026, however, that Asaib Ahl al Haq fighters had conducted drone attacks targeting US and coalition forces in northern Iraq in March 2026.[51] Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada separately said on June 3 that it would not disarm until US forces leave Iraq.[52] Likely Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada front group Saraya Awliya al Dam conditioned its disarmament on the Iraqi federal government fulfilling a large list of demands that include ending all financial and economic dependence that “restricts Iraqi sovereignty” and securing modern air defense and radar systems.[53]
Any Iraqi federal government attempt to disarm the militias and integrate them into the Iraqi security establishment that does not address the militias’ networks and allegiance to Iran will likely further embed Iranian influence within the Iraqi state. Some Iraqi officials have discussed reorganizing militia forces within Iraqi security institutions but have not specified how they plan to do so.[54] Zaydi’s spokesperson said on June 3 that the government’s effort to “disengage” militias from the PMF refers to “reorganizing these forces within the security institutions” in a way that preserves militia members’ rights and legal protections, for example.[55] It is unclear if the Iraqi federal government plans to integrate the militias into Iraqi security institutions as units or individuals. Militia-controlled PMF brigades could be reflagged as new units, which would largely retain the units’ composition, networks, and structure. Integrating the militias into the PMF or other Iraqi security institutions as reflagged units would further entrench the militias into the Iraqi state’s security sector, which would enable deeper Iranian infiltration. Zaydi’s spokesperson also said that the first step toward restricting arms to the state is “realigning” the forces, likely in reference to Iranian-backed Iraqi militia members who operate outside of militia-controlled PMF brigades, and ensuring that the “forces” only respond to the prime minister.[56]
Failing to properly address the militias’ networks and loyalty to Iran during their disarmament and integration into the Iraqi security establishment would also likely pose a threat to the institutions that the militia members would reportedly join, assuming the details of Zaydi’s proposal are accurate. The replacement of most of CTS’s top leadership during former Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s administration has led to worsening corruption and militia infiltration of what most analysts consider to be Iraq’s most effective security service.[57] The risk posed by militia infiltration of Iraq’s security services is especially great, given the extent to which the United States funds the Iraqi security establishment.[58] CTS gave a Kataib Hezbollah-owned company $12 million USD in its 2023 budget, for example.[59]
The Badr Organization denied on June 3 that the framework and Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri had formed a committee to restrict arms to the Iraqi state.[60] Iraqi and regional reporting noted in early May that the committee, which included Ameri, Zaydi, and Sudani, had been preparing a plan to disarm the militias.[61] Iraqi media previously reported that the framework chose Ameri for the committee because his ties to Iran were meant to “help build trust with the militias and persuade them to engage with the state.”[62] Badr has integrated itself into Iraqi state institutions to a greater extent than other Iranian-backed Iraqi militias since 2003.[63] Badr would likely face economic blowback to a greater extent than other militias if the United States imposed sanctions or other financial pressure on the Iraqi federal government over failing to address the militias, given the extent of Badr’s dealings with the Iraqi state. Ameri may have denied the committee’s existence in response to backlash from more ideologically hardline elements of the Badr Organization.
